

The Aftermath of *Coup d'Etat* Against Mohammad Mosaddeq of Iran in 1953: Reflections from British Documents

Mansoureh Ebrahimi
Kamaruzaman Yusoff

ABSTRACT: *The present study investigates the Britain's efforts after the 1953 coup in Iran. The mentioned coup is a vital milestone in the study of contemporary history of Iran. The coup that terminated to collapse Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq from the power. Mosaddeq was arrested and imprisoned after the coup. The present article investigates two main targets. In the first place, it intends to study the British attempts in deciding to exterminate Mosaddeq's government. Secondly, it tries to elucidate the British strategies to deal with various events happened, particularly after the coup. The exact analysis has been used to examine how British documents have shed a new light to the history of the 1953 coup. The resultant study manifests that through the coup plan and via controlling the internal circumstances of Iran after the coup, British – supported also by the USA – were the most considerable factor in changing the domestic and foreign policies of Iran.*

KEY WORDS: *The coup, Mosaddeq's government, British and USA strategies, and changing the domestic and foreign policies of Iran.*

INTRODUCTION

The 1953 coup has a vital role in manifesting the contemporary political history of Iran. It was the Britain's main target to manipulate the extraordinary benefit of oil which was nationalized by Mosaddeq's persistent efforts on March 20th, 1951. Mohammad Mosaddeq was considered as the most crucial obstacle for British. British were not able to satisfy Mohammad Mosaddeq to reach to an oil agreement just as what they had achieved before. On the other hand, they could not overthrow

Mansoureh Ebrahimi and **Kamaruzaman Yusoff** are Lecturers at the School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities UKM (National University of Malaysia), Bangi, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia. They can be reached at: kamaruz@pkriscc.ukm.my

Mosaddeq's government through oil boycott. Consequently, the decision to topple Mohammad Mosaddeq from power was a plot programmed by British.

In order to expropriate Mosaddeq's ruling power in government, which was considered as a significant goal for British, they took extensive measures. Their most effective and assuring task were cooperating with another great known superpower as USA (United States of America). Though, contrary to British, Americans did not agree a coup in the first place, they entirely changed their mind by the time President Dwight Eisenhower took the power on January 1953. Being influenced by Winston Churchill's notions and his stimulating ideas, and knowing the danger of Communist's dominance in Iran, they fixed their positions as a coup supporter. The coup plan and plot was indeed initiated by British, though, their apparent role in handling coup was weaker than U.S. government.

Mohammad Mosaddeq's government was overthrown by interference of the Britain Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations on August 19th, 1953. This is a subject that is expounded previously by several historians. Mohammad Mosaddeq was toppled from power by both internal and foreign elements' operations and interactions against him. The evidence happened in 1953 coup can be compared to a puzzle. Each piece of the puzzle reflects the role of the elements of the coup. It seems that the Britain role is more significant than others in the puzzle. Actually, it is not only a shape but also a concept and attempt to have covert governance in Iran.

This article is trying to give a new perspective of what was happened after the coup to mark the British effort to put away Mosaddeq's government and his attitudes within public, and to try to change people's mind against Mosaddeq as a national leader to gain freedom and liberty.¹

British knew Mohammad Mosaddeq and his activeness, ideas, and relations with clergies in a high degree. Mosaddeq was seventy years old when he took power in office as a Prime Minister in April 28th, 1951. He was a patriot nationalist. His thoughts were really anti-Britain. He was a capable man who was able to be a great leader. Actually, he could fully control the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) with nationalization of oil. Mainly, he was the pioneer of nationalizing oil in 1949. After that, oil was

¹Mohammad Mosaddeq, during his premiership, tried to build a strong democratic government as has been prescribed by the constitution. He started his job with nationalizing oil. He was the first democratic government official who grew the sapling of democracy, but it was defeated by 1953 coup. The most important of this study is to show the super power's involvement to keep what they definitely did after the coup. The result of that democracy has been suppressed almost more than half a century.

nationalized by leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and cooperation of the active representatives in parliament on March 15th, 1951. His effort was to achieve democracy and economic progress for Iranian people. Since he did not fuse politics and religion, British abused the lack of the religious relationship to unseat Mohammad Mosaddeq from power with a clergy, Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani.

There is no doubt that Mohammad Mosaddeq was a praiseworthy and powerful figure among people. The huge number of people who were anti-British and supporter for democracy believed in him. Moreover, his proponents were both much among public and intellectual people (Louis, 2004:128). He was a secular anti-imperialism nationalist. On the one hand, his idea was related to Iran's affairs, especially about Shah; and in the other hand, it was related to foreign superpowers. For the first time, although, Shah agreed on his reform movement towards modern country, Mohammad Mosaddeq became gradually stronger, and it made Shah lived in a dangerous situation. Consequently, Shah, as the king of Iran whose decisions should be the first in the whole country, strongly started to be closer to British to keep his government, and became opposed to Mohammad Mosaddeq.

The recognition and assertion of the most essential aspects were controlling the circumstances based on the British's tendency. Through controlling the Army, they could rule over the whole country. Concerning this, they succeeded to overcome any form of predictable anarchy and disturbance by public and Mosaddeq's advocators. They took the entire control of Army after the coup and via electing one of the military agents called Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi who was indeed a puppet in their control. Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi was the selected Prime Minister substituted for Mohammad Mosaddeq as well. He was considered as a sign of blessing and delightful message of Consortium of oil after the coup. Moreover, British succeeded to change the public opinion against Mohammad Mosaddeq through applying the internal agents and propaganda.

The resulted coup caused the renewal of Britain imperialism predominance in Iran and the sovereignty of unworthy figure. The end of 1953 was a starting point for the British interference to achieve its goal to exploit the oil resources much more than before. Although in Ann K.S. Nancy Lambton (1953) view that Iranian government was destroyed because of "stupidity, greed, and lack of judgment of the ruling classes in Persia". But, as well as stated by Wm. Roger Louis (2004:131) that there are some documents that reflect the British involvement from 1951 to 1953 even after the coup to unseat Mohammad Mosaddeq directly and to keep dictatorship in Iran.

MOSADDEQ AS PRIME MINISTER

Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq² was elected as a Prime Minister in Parliament by proposition of Jamāl Imāmī, a supporter of British (Mohammadi, 2010). Without any consultation with the members of the National Front, Mohammad Mosaddeq selected his Ministers from former statesmen and then announced some programs such as an enforcement of the National Oil Law throughout the country (which was already approved) and reforming of the National Assembly Elections Law and Municipalities (Mohammadi, 2010). In fact, Mohammad Mosaddeq was the chief of the army. Mohammad Reza Shah's power in the military was limited to sign the military orders after it was signed firstly by Mohammad Mosaddeq. Mohammad Mosaddeq sometimes did not follow those procedures but ordered directly to Minister of Defense, probably, to show his power to Mohammad Reza Shah (Fardost & Shahbāzi, 1387/2008:170).

In addition, Mohammad Mosaddeq requested one-year legislative full authority from the Parliament. Finally, those powers were given to him. Mohammad Mosaddeq did his best to get the approval of some true and liable representatives to Parliament on March 31st, 1953. Although Mohammad Reza Shah was so keen to decide everything under his order, some conflicts started between Mohammad Mosaddeq and Mohammad Reza Shah. Actually, Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to do everything out of constitutional law. The government assisted eight-person committee so that constitutional monarchy was not King's favourite anymore.³

In the following, some disagreements were took place among Shah, Mosaddeq, and Kashani. Parliament commissioned the eight-person auditor to solve those differences of opinion. After assessment, the cabinet declared that Mohammad Reza Shah would not allow to have any intervention in the political affairs. Due to raising those discords, fifty nine representatives who were proponents of Mohammad Mosaddeq resigned and seventeenth parliament disbanded. Mohammad Mosaddeq officially put an end to the life of Parliament and paved the way for the fall of his premiership since Mohammad Reza Shah confidentially abused of absence parliament; deposed Mohammad Mosaddeq and appointed Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi as a new Prime Minister (Mohammadi, 2010).

²He came to office by the maximum vote at the parliament on April 28th, 1951. The period of his premiership started from April 28th, 1951 until July 16th, 1952 and with four days break continued from July 21st, 1952 until August 19th, 1953.

³British National Archives, "Record from Tehran by Henderson: April 1, 1953 (3 p.m.)" in File No.EP1015/99A.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ TO NATIONALIZE OIL AND BRITISH RESPONS

Iran has had two oil agreements after the oil's discovery. Firstly, William Knox D'Arcy made a concession from the Shah of Qajar in 1901; furthermore, William Knox D'Arcy became a part owner of the British Oil Company in 1905. Although the Britain government bought William Knox D'Arcy's shares in 1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) found two million pounds (Nirumand, 1967:26-27). This agreement led to opposition from the Iranian Parliament. They made a new oil agreement with British in 1933. The contract also changed the company's name from APOC to AIOC or Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Moaddel, 1989:3). Both agreements were not beneficial for Iran. Manssor Moaddel explained as follows:

It can be seen the first agreement was a private concession between William Knox D'Arcy and the Shah of Iran. The second agreement also had not any benefits for Iran. For instance, based on Article Nineteen of the agreement, the prices of purification of the petroleum production were based on average Romanian or Gulf of Mexico f.o.b. prices whichever was lower, and the costs of transportation and distribution were less a 10 percent discount. So, the sale of the oil to local consumers was based on prices which were established in areas. The production cost of oil averaged \$1.2 per ton in Middle East. In contrast, for the same amount was \$12.45 in the United States. It shows that the British made the 500 percent profit from the sale of the petroleum products to the local people in Iran. Consequently, Iran had to import oil from the Soviet Union because the AIOC sold oil to Iran in high price (Moaddel, 1989:6-7).

The unfair activities by the AIOC and also the high price of oil inside Iran made Iran's government import oil from the Soviet Union. Hence, Iran is located in the Middle East where it is very rich in natural resources like petroleum, and of course it causes that powerful countries such as Britain and U.S. have greatly focused on Iran in terms of its petroleum.

In the early 1950s, Mohammad Mosaddeq, a democrat patriotic, achieved a significant outcome in nationalizing oil which was controlled by British. The oil commission held twelve meetings from Bahman 9th, 1329 to Esfand 17th, 1329 (January 29th, 1951 to March 8th, 1951) to study the political, economical, and judicial aspects of the situation. The committee made its final decision based on the agreement of the majority of the members on Thursday, Esfand 17th, 1329 (March 8th, 1951) and submitted the results to the National Consultative Assembly. The decisions were finally approved in the Sena Assembly on Esfand 29th, 1329 (March 20th, 1951). After the approval of the Oil Nationalization Law, some notes were exchanged between Britain and Iran's governments in which the Britain government prevented Iran from the Oil Nationalization. The Iran

government responded that Oil Nationalization Law had been approved through the majority of votes and the Oil Commission had already started studying the execution law. With continues efforts of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the Oil Commission submitted the final report of the Oil Nationalization execution to the National Consultative Assembly. The National Consultative Assembly sanctioned the mentioned law on Ordibehesht 7th (April 27th) which was further approved by Sena on Ordibehesht 10th (April 30th) (Fateh, 1384/2005:408-411).

In the twentieth century, historical background of relationship between Britain and Iran refers to oil. The most significant interest of Britain was mainly the AIOC refinery in Abadan. It was the largest source of foreign asset for them. They themselves believed that oil belongs to them since they discovered it. Regarding this beliefs, Mohammad Mosaddeq was considered as an obstacle for them.

Mohammad Mosaddeq confronted the British disagreement when he started an active move to nationalize oil. The Britain Ambassador wrote a letter to Iran's Prime Minister and expressed their concern about nationalizing oil of APOC before oil agreement expired (Akhavan Tavakkoli, 1386/2007:262). Moreover, the Britain Ambassador wrote another letter and proposed to Hosein Ala⁴ on Esfand 23rd, 1329 (March 14th, 1951) through which the subject of dispute with the company based on regulation of the contract should be referred to the agreement. Although some of the parliament representatives⁵ (Ghods, 1993) promised to British not to vote for nationalizing oil, Parliament passed Nationalization Bill on March 15 (Movahhed, 1384/2006:152).

Actually, a political crisis centre started in Iran that commanded the focused attention of British intelligence agencies. Moreover, after nationalizing oil, Britain made a complaint to United Nations and to International Court of the Justice in The Hague, but it was defeated (Mosaddeq, 2007:179).

British always tried to gain oil and continued its disagreement. In the early 1951s, after oil nationalization, British forced other countries not to buy oil from the nationalized company of Iran. Consequently, Iran's economy was damaged (Rubin, 2003:106). Thus, British hit Mosaddeq's

⁴Hosein Ala was Prime Minister of Iran from Esfand 21, 1329 (March 12, 1951) to Urdibehesht 10, 1330 (April 30, 1951).

⁵General Hājī Alī Razmāra was one of the opponent people of nationalizing oil and a Prime Minister before Mohammad Mosaddeq, from June 1950 to March 1951. He was assassinated on March 7th, 1953 by one of the Fadayan-e Islam's members when he was 49 years old. Also, Rajab Ali Mansour or Mansur ul-Mulk, was one of the proponents of British.

government to show people that Mohammad Mosaddeq was not an efficient politician.

However, Mohammad Mosaddeq was a powerful politician. He was ready to confront Britain from the time when oil was nationalized. Using chronological points during his premiership exactly mark that he was a very intelligent, courageous, and determined hero. Expelling the Britain diplomatic mission on the basis of interfering domestic politics in October 1952 is one example of this claim (Louis, 2004:129). In addition, Mohammad Mosaddeq declared to the Britain government on October 7th, 1952 to acknowledge the nationalization of oil industry, not interfering in managing the oil industry, and the freedom of the government of Iran in selling its own oil products. Mohammad Mosaddeq expressed his assertion to Robert Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister of Britain, on October 7th, 1952 that the statement of October 5th is conforming by the certain rights of the government of Iran. He invited the representatives of the former oil company of Anglo-Iran to travel to Iran within one week in order to investigate the legitimate claims between the oil company and the government of Iran.

Considering the delaying payment of the oil company to the government of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq concluded that, before traveling their representatives to Iran, the oil company should pay 20 million Lira, changeable to Dollar, to the Finance Ministry of Iran. This amount was a part of the 49 million Lira. He stated that the remaining debt should be paid to the government of Iran in the end of the above mentioned meeting which was expected to be taken place within a maximum of three weeks (Fateh, 1384/2005:624-625). Therefore, those actions caused British to be more concern and heavily involved.

Although Mohammad Mosaddeq was not a Communist, British via its propaganda tried to show him as cooperating closely with Communists. On the other hand, British cleared the danger of Communist advancement and convinced American to oppose Communists (Louis, 2004:128). In fact, British applied American power as a pretext for overthrowing Mohammad Mosaddeq. Nevertheless, Shah feared to lose his throne and asked British and American to overthrow Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1952.

First of all, President Harry Truman refused to help Shah. After that, President Dwight Eisenhower agreed to assist Shah when he took power in January 1953. The Dwight Eisenhower administration started to cooperate with British to do a covert operation against Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran (Rubin, 2003:105). Roosevelt's agent ordered Shah to leave Tehran and Shah fled on August 15. Roosevelt managed to convince the Iranian

politicians by offering money to cooperate with him. In addition, British and American spent money in army (Behrooz, 2004:124) and Iranian society to gain their support (Taghipour, 2006:168).

Roosevelt assured the Iranian actors of the coup that Mosaddeq's government was going out. He mobilized some demonstrators into the streets. Actually, one of the main factors for coup which was arranged by British and American against Mohammad Mosaddeq was demonstration by alliance between two groups of Iranians. One group was proponents of the Iranian Royal Family under Shah, and the other was supporters of the clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah Kashani (Taghipour, 2006:167). Hence, demonstration in that chaotic situation was a crucial blow to a nationalist movement, headed by Mohammad Mosaddeq. Therefore, those elements paved the way for doing coup successfully.

As a result, coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq was a CIA-covert operation and caused regime change. "*Operation Ajax restored the briefly deposed Shah of Iran to the Peacock Throne, where he would reign for more than a quarter-century*" (Gizzi, 2003:18).

MEASURES TAKEN BY BRITISH AFTER THE COUP ACCORDING TO SOME DOCUMENTS

Events in Iran, in twentieth century, reflect some regime changes. In the first place, Rezā Shāh Pahlavī overthrew Ahmad Shāh Qājār, the last shah of the Qājār Dynasty, by measures taken from British on Esfand 3rd, 1299 coup or February 22nd, 1921 (Shahbazi, 2010). Following that, British forced Rezā Shāh Pahlavī to abdicate from power in Shahrivar in 1320 (1941) and replaced Mohammad Rezā, his son, to the throne. Then, during Mohammad Rezā Shāh kingdom, a great change was happened by both the British intervention and the U.S. participation in 1953 to unseat Mohammad Mosaddeq in order to prevent the Soviet Union from rising communist (Rubin, 2003:105-106).

According to documents in the British National Archives, events were given a minutely detail, not only before but also after the coup until Mohammad Mosaddeq's entire overthrowing. These documents exactly addressed the British intention. There was no reason for British to involve themselves in Iran's civil politics since their agent, Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi, was ruling over the country and operated as the British aims.⁶

⁶Within the period of two weeks after the coup, British officials were given a very stern warning not to give any opinion on the coup. They were trying to show to the people that they were impartial in this turn of events. See, for further information, British National Archives, "Secret Security Information: August 19, 1953" in File No.EP1015/213;

After the successful coup, British took two main strategic actions, namely to demoralize Mohammad Mosaddeq and to boost the position of Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi. Although the coup was indeed successful, there are some proofs that British tried to decrease the elective figure of Mohammad Mosaddeq in public eyes and to boost Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi's role. According to British report, they had to convict Mohammad Mosaddeq and his allies as part of the strategy to demoralize him.⁷ Comments by Mr. Henderson on the Mohammad Mosaddeq's trial and his present situation in Persia reflect that his impact on public opinion seemed to be declining and that was not entirely due to the fact that Mohammad Mosaddeq himself was no longer testifying.⁸ All of those actions against Mohammad Mosaddeq performed by British were major reasons to show that British in the first step intended to control army not to support Mohammad Mosaddeq.⁹

Mohammad Mosaddeq had been transferred from the Saltanatabad barracks to the prison of Qasr-i-Qajar. There is an example which Mohammad Mosaddeq at first refused to defend himself or attend the court, but later started to declare something about his relations with Europe that referred to over thirty-years ago. Then, he faced encountered warnings from the court that his statements were irrelevant.¹⁰

British National Archives, "From Washington to Foreign Office: August 20, 1953" in File No.EP1015/212; British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report: August 20, 1953" in File No.EP1016/25; British National Archives, "British Embassy: August 20, 1953" in File No.EP1016/219; British National Archives, "Foreign Office, B.W.1.: August 23, 1953" in File No.EP1016/214; British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report: August 21, 1953" in File No.EP1016/26; British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report: August 22, 1953" in File No.EP1016/215(E); British National Archives, "Coming Telegram, American Embassy, London: August 22, 1953" in File No.EP1016/215(I); British National Archives, "British Embassy: August 22, 1953" in File No.EP1016/225; British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report: August 24, 1953" in File No.EP1016/215(D); British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report: August 27, 1953" in File No.EP1016/215(H); and British National Archives, "Coming Telegram, American Embassy, London: August 31, 1953" in File No.EP1016/215(J).

⁷British National Archives, "Report on Aspects of Political Environment of Zahedi Government: September 26, 1953" in File No.EP1015/252.

⁸Mohammad Mosaddeq was put on trial on 8th September 1953. See also British National Archives, "Records by Ambassador Henderson: November 19, 1953" in File No.LP1015/264; and British National Archives, "Minutes by C.T. Gandy: November 9, 1953" in File No.EP1015/259.

⁹British National Archives, "Communicated by U.S. Embassy: November 24, 1953" in File No.EP1015/264B.

¹⁰British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report, Internal Affairs, Foreign Office: December 15, 1953" in File No.EP1015/266(B).

The second step taken by British was to enhance Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi's position. The existence evidence also shows some incidents after the coup that British interfered to keep General Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi as the Prime Minister although they doubted about Zahedi's capabilities.¹¹ Although British managed to control army by approving Zahedi's role as the General of the Army to become a Prime Minister, British were not sure whether Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi could do effectively for the political and economic stability in Iran.¹² General Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi in his statement told the public two conflicting ideas: *first*, to continue relationship with British; and *second*, to observe oil nationalization.¹³

British consistently got the reports not only through British Embassy in Tehran but through their correspondence with U.S. Embassy in Iran. According to Foreign Office Report, Mr. Nixon congratulated the Iran government for resuming relationship with Britain. He declared that an oil settlement will happen by American. There was an exchange of congratulation between the U.S. President and General Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi.¹⁴ This event probably took place after the time Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi received some financial help from the United States of America (Gasiorowski, 2004:257).

However, the pattern of congratulation in that situation by American was not for enhancing relations between British and Iran. They were so hopeful to gain a new oil agreement to have the massive shares of oil. As a result, after the coup, American who spent a lot of money to do a coup gained an opportunity as the British partner in a new oil agreement, Consortium (Nejati, 1371/1992:80-87).¹⁵

¹¹According to report on the meeting between Henderson and the Shah, the latter questioned on Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi's performance as a new leader although Henderson tried to convince him that Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi is the best option. For example, Shah was not very happy with Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. See, for further information, British National Archives, "Minutes by C.T. Gandy: September 14, 1953" in File No.EP1015/237; and British National Archives, "Communicated by U.S. Embassy: September 22, 1953" in File No.EP1015/242.

¹²British National Archives, "Communicated by U.S. Embassy: November 24, 1953" in File No.EP1015/264B.

¹³British National Archives, "From Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution, Tehran Situation Report Resumption of Diplomatic Relations: December 8, 1953" in File No.EP1015/266.

¹⁴British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report, Internal Affairs, Foreign Office: December 15, 1953" in File No.EP1015/266(B).

¹⁵After the coup, on April 11th, 1954, the Consortium Representatives came to Tehran and a new oil agreement. The International Consortium was formed between Iran and four countries concluding the United States of America, Britain, France, and Netherlands

Minutes by C.T. Gandy on December 30th, 1953 marked the British concern about Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi who was not safe because Qanatabadi, Kashani's son in law who used to help Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi, changed his mind. The British feared that he was the one who led a demonstration against new Prime Minister. Then, Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi tried to bribe Kashani by sending him abroad for holiday in order to reduce anti-government movement.¹⁶

British were so concerned about Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi himself, although he was not in danger. After the coup, Shah regained the power and had no conflict with Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi anymore. They changed clergy's opinion in an optimistic manner toward themselves. The previous Prime Minister was in jail and most of politicians, particularly the members of Tudeh Party, were under surveillance by government. All in all, the British aim completely was to gain profits from oil and Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi was merely a mediator to facilitate oil agreement. It is true that the British efforts had accomplished in a new oil agreement.

Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi was a supporter of Britain. He tried to convince the public that they must stop all anti-government movements, otherwise the foreign powers would attack Iran since Iranian government was still weak. Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi was highly anxious since Shah failed to sign a decree to resolve the Parliament.¹⁷ This particular issue had been one of the topics of discussion between Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi and Henderson when they met on September 1st, 1953.¹⁸

With respect to some of the documents in the archive of British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), various reactions of the people can be shown just five days after the first Mosaddeq's trial. People who were supporters of Mohammad Mosaddeq had staged demonstrations, especially in Tehran. Those demonstrations probably initiated by the Tudeh Party.¹⁹ Security forces were ordered to perform violence.²⁰ Furthermore, people's opinions

for selling oil. According to that agreement, forty percent of shares of Iran's oil belonged to the five American Companies, beside from another forty percent which belonged to British Oil Company, the fourteen percent belonged to a Holland Oil Company, and the rest about six percent reminding belonged to a French Oil Company. On September 27th, 1954, the Consortium Agreement was sent to Parliament by Dr. Amini.

¹⁶British National Archives, "Minutes by C.T. Gandy: December 30, 1953" in File No.EP1015/272.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸British National Archives, "Communicated by U.S. Embassy: September 1, 1953" in File No.EP1015/229.

¹⁹British National Archives, "Minutes by C.T. Gandy: November 13, 1953" in File No.EP1015/259c.

²⁰*Ibid.*

in different levels of the society were marked by documents. For instance, students surrounding the university campus distributed “*a number of crudely printed pamphlets attacking the visit of Vice-President Nixon*” and they denounced the government their opposition to imperialists such as Britain and U.S.A.²¹ In this case, British obviously believed that the action was related to Tudeh Party. It can be said that they were the intellectual shell of the society and they comprehended the British policy in Iran. Tudeh Party made an effort that Soviet Union government take the advantage of oil resources while Mohammad Mosaddeq’s advocators and majority of Iranian were opposed to give any sort of oil privilege to foreign states.

Also, there was some news regarding different views of a variety of people in Iran. For instance, the newspaper in Tehran accepted the news about diplomatic relations and that Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi was effective. Baqa’i said that they accepted diplomatic relations but they did not agree on oil agreement with Britain. Since Baqa’i was one of the U.S. supporters. During those days, American tried hard to have oil share not less than Britain. Moreover, the people of Tabriz were against the noncommittal diplomatic relations, and many people in Mashad believed that Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi signed an oil agreement with Britain.²² Ordinary people did not know anything about events in that time.

In addition, Kashani was one of the clergies who first agreed with Mohammad Mosaddeq and then changed his mind and supported Shah’s administration.²³ After the August 16th, 1953 coup, Kashani²⁴ allowed Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi to stay in Parliament because of the assassin of the Brigadier Afshar Tūs (Mohammadi, 1385/2006:119-126)²⁵ who was doubted by Mozaffar Baghaī and Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi. Kashani also ordered others to treat Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi in a very respectful manner while he was in Parliament. Apart from this, to cooperate with Kashani, Roosevelt sent the amount of ten thousand Dollars to Kashani by Ahmad Aramesh, though nobody knew whether he received the money

²¹British National Archives, “Minutes by D.L. Stewart: December 11, 1953” in File No.EP1015/271.

²²*Ibid.*

²³Later on, British reported that Ayatullah Behbahani sent his message of support to Shah. See also British National Archives, “Tehran Situation Report: August 22, 1953” in File No.EP1015/215(E).

²⁴Kashani was the Head of Parliament at that time.

²⁵Brigadier Afshar Tūs was the Police Governor during the Mosaddeq’s premiership. The story of arrest and terror of Brigadier Afshar Tūs shows that people involved in the coup have started weakening the government from Shahrivar 1332 (August 1953) by showing the lack of security and competence in governing the country by Mosaddeq.

or not (Monazzah, 1387/2008). It is that there was an extensive distance among social classes.

Moreover, British and American showed their concern on the fate of Shah as the monarch of Iran. It seems that the British involvement was not due to action which Shah would do. At the same time, the only important element for Shah was to regain power. He was a person whose father took the power from the last Shah of Qajar, Sultan Ahmad Shah, by participation of British in February 1921 coup. Shah always had doubts whether British would agree to continue his imperial or not.

Shah also feared to leave the country. He thought that he would lose his throne, then he turned back to Iran, regained his full power and ruled a dictatorship administration. Basically, Shah chose directly the government characters because the Prime Minister's independent power was ended. The government decided to have legislature elections. The Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to grant visas to all British staff of the Foreign Affairs.²⁶ Therefore, foreign relations with the United States of America and Britain, and some other countries, increased after Mohammad Mosaddeq.²⁷

All of the rules returned back to be under Shah's power. The 1953 coup, apparently, overthrew Mohammad Mosaddeq's government, but mainly obtained the permanence of Shah (Rubin, 2003:106). Aside from that, Shah was so concern about the economic situation. In order to stabilize the economy of the country, he asked some loans from outside but British insisted that they must settle an oil agreement first.²⁸

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, in his book (Pahlavi, 1375/1996:70-77),²⁹ asserted that events during the coup was the Iranian national uprising to the purpose of supporting Shah although American emphasized a point of the coup several times which they themselves were overthrown Mohammad Mosaddeq's government by the military coup. The matter is that the explanation of Shah is so far away of reality, and he wanted to represent his position prominently.

²⁶British National Archives, "Tehran Situation Report, Internal Affairs, Foreign Office: December 15, 1953" in File No.EP1015/266(B).

²⁷British National Archives, "Foreign Policy, Letter from Swiss Minister in Tehran: November 1953" in File No.EP1015/265.

²⁸British National Archives, "Communicated by U.S. Embassy: September 22, 1953" in File No.EP1015/242, p.4.

²⁹Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi said that population of Iran were informed of a huge danger which threatened at the moment drop of country. People such as supporters of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the members of Tudeh Party, workers, employees, students, soldiers, and even women and children went on the streets with a unique ambition and aspiration. They started to have struggle against an irresponsible dictator. It made Mohammad Mosaddeq's escape of his house wearing the night dress. Then Shah was returned to homeland and was confronted people's passionate welcoming.

To conclude, the coup indeed changed the history of Iran, and Shah dramatically influenced the history of the Cold War in Iran for twenty-five years (Gizzi, 2003:8). In 1953, the young tree of Iranian democracy which led by Mohammad Mosaddeq was cut by coup. The remaining question is whether the coup was happened only by participation of Britain and United States, whether Shah could continue his throne alone, and could prevent the increasing power of Mohammad Mosaddeq. One of the main keys is that personal weakness of Shah himself was the gate for British and American intervention. It is clear that Shah firstly requested American to intervene against Mosaddeq who was a popular nationalist leader. British, from time to time, managed to meddle with internal policies in Iran. In the following, Iran government promised to continue Britain support.³⁰

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the British programmers and The U.S.A. actors played a major role to overthrow Mohammad Mosaddeq of Iran. The *coup d'état* was succeeded on August 19th, 1953. The importance of this article is to seriously examine the concern of British, based on the documents in the British National Archives, after the coup. British prudently concealed their apparent active role in the events taken place in that time. However, their fundamental plot of coup was designed by the British itself. British continued their action with propaganda against Mohammad Mosaddeq after the coup. They tried to convey this impression to the Iranians that they made a mental mistake in the way of democracy. They instigated people's feelings to oppose Mohammad Mosaddeq and to support Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Actually, Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader of National Front, was the first martyr in Iran's democracy.

Apart from propaganda against Mohammad Mosaddeq, British made an atmosphere of optimism to encourage people to believe that Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi is able to approach Iran closer to modernity and he is capable to solve all their economic issues. His demagoguery made public view turn from the Mohammad Mosaddeq's support. It is clear that the intellectuals stated their disagreement, but they were suppressed by Army. Absolutely, the intellectual demonstrators understood what British, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi did. The

³⁰British National Archives, "From Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution, Tehran Situation Report Resumption of Diplomatic Relations: December 8, 1953" in File No.EP1015/266.

ordinary people did not know about politics at all, although they were among majority of the society.

The coup as a new crisis brought a new Prime-Minister and a new regime under Shah's power. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi made a new oil agreement based on the British interest. Although British were worried about Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi's government after the coup, they were glad and proud of what they did with the U.S. participation. Therefore, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and superpowers gained their common purposes. As a monomaniac Shah, obviously, was fond of power, and superpowers wanted to prevent Iran from economic modernity and democracy, and to disturb all freedom and nationalism movements in Iran. Iranians have been paying the valuable prices, from economical and political control of superpowers to many people's life, for democracy during many decades. Today, green movement maybe considered as an indicator for continuing the national movement, which was formally built by Mohammad Mosaddeq through Oil Nationalization, in the long way of founding democracy in Iran.

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