



SEFRIYONO & MUKHIBAT

Preventing Religious Radicalism Based on Local Wisdom: Interrelation of *Tarekat*, *Adat*, and Local Authority in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia

ABSTRACT: *The integrated relation between the sufi order of Syattariyah, the Minangkabau tradition or custom, and the local authority of Nagari Sungai Buluah, Sub-District of Batang Anai, Regency of Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera has become a local wisdom that acts as a social capital for the prevention of religious radicalism in the region. The relation is seen from three social domains, such as “bersurau kaum dan bemasjid nagari” (must have little mosque at the community ethnic level and have mosque at district or regency level); “bermamak ibadat dan bermamak adat” (must have Islamic worship leader and custom or tradition’s leader); and “bermufti nagari dan bernagari” (must obey to the Islamic law adviser in the community and must have district or regency). This article, based on the qualitative study, tries to elaborate the position and roles of sufi order, custom, and local wisdoms in preventing the Islamic radicalism in West Sumatera. The findings show that the traditional institutions, such as little mosque and mosques in the village and regency level; Islamic worship and custom leaders; sufi order of Syattariyah, and Islamic law adviser in the regency level have the critical roles in preventing the Islamic radicalism. The radical organizations, such as the LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Institute of Islamic Preaching) and “Salafi” (renewel of Islamic thought and movement) cannot growth develop well in Nagari Sungai Buluah, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera.*

KEY WORD: *Preventing; Islamic Radicalism; Interrelation of Institutions; Islamic Community; West Sumatera People.*

RESUME: *“Mencegah Radikalisme Agama Berdasarkan Kearifan Lokal: Interelasi Tarekat, Adat, dan Otoritas Lokal di Padang Pariaman, Sumatera Barat, Indonesia”. Relasi terintegrasi antara tarekat Syattariyah, adat Minangkabau, dan pemerintahan lokal di Nagari Sungai Buluah, Kecamatan Batang Anai, Kabupaten Padang Pariaman, Sumatera Barat telah menjadi kearifan lokal yang berperan sebagai modal sosial bagi pencegahan radikalisme agama di sebuah nagari. Relasi tersebut terlihat dari tiga domain sosial, seperti “bersurau kaum dan bemasjid nagari”; “bermamak ibadat dan bermamak adat”; serta “bermufti nagari dan bernagari”. Artikel ini, berdasarkan studi kualitatif, berusaha untuk mengelaborasi kedudukan dan peranan tarekat, adat, dan kearifan lokal dalam mencegah paham Islam radikal di Sumatera Barat. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa surau dan mesjid nagari; mamak ibadat dan mamak adat; tarekat Syattariyah; dan mufti nagari berperanan penting dalam mencegah paham Islam radikal. Organisasi radikal, seperti LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia) dan paham Salafi tidak dapat tumbuh dan berkembang dengan baik di Nagari Sungai Buluah, Padang Pariaman, Sumatera Barat.*

KATA KUNCI: *Pencegahan; Paham Islam Radikal; Interelasi Institusi; Umat Islam; Masyarakat Sumatera Barat.*

About the Authors: **Sefriyono, M.Pd.** is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Ushuluddin and Religious Studies UIN (State Islamic University) Padang, Jalan Prof. Mahmud Yunus, Lubuk Lintah, Anduring, Kuranji, Kota Padang, West Sumatera, Indonesia. **Dr. Mukhibat** is a Lecturer at the Faculty of *Tarbiyah* and Teaching Science IAIN (State Islamic Religion Institute) Ponorogo, Jalan Pramuka No.156 Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia. Corresponding authors: yonolbgn@gmail.com and mukhibat@stainponorogo.ac.id

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INTRODUCTION

As Lazuardi Birru mentioned that Indonesia is vulnerable to radicalism and terrorism (cited in Meijer *et al.* eds., 2012; and Abubakar, 2016). A survey on June-July 2011 shows vulnerability index of radicalism in Indonesia is 43.6%; it decreased 1.44% from previous year that was 45.4%. The survey employs *multistage random sampling* to 4,840 respondents in 33 Provinces. Religious affiliations of respondents are Islam (86.3%), Christianity (11.1%), and others (2.6%). Although the index is lowering, it is still vulnerable to possible radical activities. Indices 43.6 are far from safeness level, that is 33.3 (cited in IRI, 2009; and Abubakar, 2016).

The number is subject to change, due to escalation of religious radicalism which recently happens, such as in Talikota and Singkil. Even though vulnerable to radicalism and terrorism, still, the treatment is mostly by weapon rather than by cultural approach – repressive and curative rather than preventive and preservative. Curative social treatment is usually conducted to religious radicalism activity that already taken place, in order to recover situation (Ashour, 2008; and Bokhari, 2017).

Preservative treatment, through maintaining moderate-Muslim groups, is rarely taken in against radicalism in Indonesia (Rokhmad, 2012:110). Meanwhile, Mukhibat (2014b) stated that treatment for radicalism can also by re-education and re-motivation that should be taken by many parties, including government, society, Islamic educational institution, and *kelompok pengajian* or Islamic congregation forums (Mukhibat, 2014b:30).

Basically, a society has its own way to deal with its problems, including religious radicalism. One of them is by empowering its cultural potentials. Regrettably, this approach is not often implemented in Indonesia. In preventive and preservative level, empowering local wisdom is a better option, due to the levels are mainly associated with relevant values in countering religious radicalism. So far, local wisdom is merely implemented to

handle social conflicts – people are safe from destructive conflicts since acting up to local norms and values (Hartomo, Dewi & Pancasiwi, 2015; and Rumansra, 2015).

Local wisdom is understood by cultural synthesis that initiated by local actors through repeated process; internalizing and interpreting teaching in religion and culture that are announced in norms and become daily way of life for people. Local wisdom as unwritten codes that covers all aspects of society are: firstly, codes of relationship, both interpersonal and personal to community, including relation with traditional authority or *pemerintahan adat*, inter-clan marriage code, and daily good manner; secondly, codes of human-nature relation, both animal and plant, with the intention of natural conservation, as in Maluku with its *sisa darat* and *sisa laut*; and thirdly, codes of human and spirits relation, including to God and other spiritual beings. Local wisdom can be manifested in custom, institution, and wise words (Ferguson, 2011; and Dahliani, Soemarno & Setijanti, 2015).

Local wisdom, as a culture, always does reproduction according to human needs and cultural adaptation patterns. Cultural reproduction is an active process that reaffirms the culture in social life; therefore, it requires adaptation to community which has different cultural background (Abdullah, 2010:41). As a product of culture, local wisdom reproduction depends on, as Clifford Geertz (1973) mentioned, “world view” of certain social group. World view refers to an intellectual understanding, a way to consider the world and how it works, in certain social group whether on the base of religion, ethnicity, or politics (*cf* Geertz, 1973; and Mufid, 2010:85).

When the world view considered to be powerless to solve social problems, for example *pelagandong*, which is believed as world view of social harmony but unable to diminish conflicts in Ambon and Maluku; therefore, cultural reproduction will take place to formulate a new world view. When villages in Ambon were suffering unrest ethno-religious conflicts, people of Desa Wayame, sub-district Teluk Ambon, Baguala,

reproduce and introduce the restored older code by unionizing "Team 20" to protect their village from destructive conflicts (Buchanan ed., 2011; and Ansori *et al.*, 2015).

The team is formed by people through deliberation or *musyawarah*. The Team 20 consists of 10 Muslims and 10 Christians' representatives. The task are to solve problems which cause conflicts, decide social sanction to people who break the rule, and coordinate with government. This local wisdom reproduction has been saved Wayame people, who have religious diversity, from destructive conflicts (Mufid, 2010:85; and Ansori *et al.*, 2015).

In different circumstances and problem, people of *Nagari* (a conglomeration of villages or settlements) Sungai Buluah in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia succeeded also in implementing their local wisdom to counter religious radicalism. Integrative relation of *tarekat* (sufi order) of *Syattariyah*, Minangkabau tradition, and local authority has accomplished in shutting out radical religious movement, such LDII (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia* or Indonesia Institute of Islamic Preaching) and *Salafi* (Renewal of Islamic Thought)¹ from institutionalizing their ideology.

This research paper, by using the qualitative method (Creswell, 2009; Charmaz, 2000; Hackett, 2003; Piela, 2012; and Guest, Namey & Mitchel, 2013), explores the mechanism of countering religious radicalism, which has been existed and developed naturally in *Nagaris*, West Sumatera, Indonesia. Nevertheless, theoretical discourse in religious radicalism is not neglected.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Radical Islamic Group in Padang Pariaman. Before explains radical groups in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, it discusses the meaning of

¹The definition of *Salafi*, in general, is a member of a strictly orthodox *Sunni* Muslim sect advocating a return to the early Islam of the *Al-Qur'an* and *Al-Sunnah* (Fitzpatrick & Walker eds., 2014); or *Salafis*, in general, are those who follow the example of the early Muslim community (Beranek & Tupek, 2009).

religious radicalism and its earlier phase in West Sumatera. A. Hornby (1989), as quoted also by Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (2012) and Yumimah Rahmatullah (2017), explained that "radicalism" is derived from *radical* that means root or foundation. As a noun, radical means a person who has radical views in politics and religion. Radicalism means *belief in radical ideas and principles* (Hornby, 1989; Mufid, 2012:2; and Rahmatullah, 2017).

Moreover, Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (2012) proposes that indicators of religious radical group in Indonesia are as following here: look upon Indonesian government as *thagut* or evil; disrespect national anthem and national flag; has tighter emotional bound to group than to family, school, and workplace; exclusively religious gathering and training; atoning for sins or pay for redemption; has specific performance, such as wear pants with the end above ankle or *cingkrang*, keep the beard, and use veil or *niqab/cadar* for women; accuse Muslim outside the group as infidel, or *kafir* and *fasik*, unless they do *hijrah*; and unwilling to listen sermons from non-member (Mufid, 2012:2).

Azyumardi Azra (1996), beside categorizes radical fundamentalism movement into two types i.e. pre-modern that represented by Wahabi and contemporary by IM (*Ikhwanul Muslimin* or Muslim Brotherhood) with key-figures: Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, and Abu A'la Maududi, who concern on the failure of modernity - therefore should be rejected; he also mentions classical radicalism which was initiated by *Khawarij*, the more extreme group that held a motto "no law but law of God" (Azra, 1996:113).

Considering its symbolic and actual violent, Nur Syam (2011) releases the radical Islamic movements, i.e. HTI (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* or Liberation Party of Indonesia); MMI (*Majelis Mujahiddin Indoneisa* or Indonesian Mujahiddin Council); *Salafi* (Renewal of Islamic Thought); LD (*Laskar Djundullah* or Paramilitary Troops of God); LJ (*Laskar Jihad* or Endeavor's Warriors); and FKAWJ as *Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal-Jamaah* or Communication

Forum for Islamic Sunni Members (Syam, 2011). Meanwhile, Islamic educational institutions which considered to the breeding ground of radicalism are *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) *Islamic Center of Bin Bas* in Yogyakarta; *Pesantren of Ihya' al-Sunnah* (Awakening of Islamic Sunni) in Kampung Jawa Baru, Lhokseumawe, Banda Aceh, Aceh; *Pesantren of Minhajus Sunnah* (Principles of Islamic Sunni) Mungkid in Magelang, Central Java; and *Pesantren of Hidayatullah* (God Bless) Mataram in Nusa Tenggara Barat or Sundanese Little Islands in Indonesia (Mukhibat, 2014a:189).

In West Sumatera, religious radicalism is often associated to *Padri* movement (A'la, 2008; and Zakariya & Salleh, 2011). In this context, Azyumardi Azra (1996) said that *Padri* movement begun with moderate renewal that initiated by Tuanku Nan Tuo and his pupils from Surau Koto Tuo, Agam, since the last quarter of eighteen century (Azra, 1996). Tough opposition between moderate reformer and *kaum adat* (the traditional or custom faction) was a significant factor of radicalization progress among Tuanku Nan Tuo followers, particularly Tuanku Nan Renceh. In 1803, the return of *tiga haji* (three hajjs), namely Haji Miskin, Haji Sumanik, dan Haji Piobang, who went to hajj in the time of Wahabi glory in Mecca and becomes a trigger for *Padri's jihad* movement against Muslim who reject their hard principles (Azra, 1996; and Yaakop & Idris, 2017).

Padri and *Wahabi* shares identical views on opposing heresy and superstition, or *bid'ah dan khurafat*, and banning tobacco and silk (Azra, 1996:113). In this context, Jeffrey Hadler (2008) mentioned that *Padri* war as the first "Muslim *jihad* against Muslim" in Southeast Asia (Hadler, 2008:9).

Salafi, which is often considered to be metamorphosis of Wahabi, encourages purification of practices (*ubudiyah*) from superstition, myth, and heresy; and confines to their selves to the life of the Prophet Muhammad SAW (*Salallahu Alaihi Wassalam* or peace be upon him), and his disciples, appeared in West Sumatera around 1998 (Hilmi, 2012:152). *Salafi* meetings in its

members houses, for example, when it held in the house of dr. Amri Mansur, an ex-member of *Laskar Jihad*, declare the FKAWJ (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah*) and issuing *jihad* (endeavor or holy war in Islam) obligation to Maluku (Buchanan ed., 2011).

Necessity of *jihad* becomes polemic that splits of *Salafi* in West Sumatera into two groups: *Salafi of Yamani* that tightly holds *Salafi* principles, such as abstain in general election and uncooperative with other groups; and *Salafi of Sururi* that relatively lessen the principle by allowing its members to participate in general election as long as the candidate has conformity with *Salafi* principles or *manhaj*. Both of them, however, share the same commitment (Noorhaidi, 2005; and Jahroni, 2015).

Their existences, according to Minangkabau proverb, *mambankik batang tarandam* (awaken a sunken tree) from the ruins of *Padri*. West Sumatran *Salafi* figure, Muhammad Elvy Syam, asserts that *Salafi* proselytizing in early period has been energized by Minangkabau figures two centuries ago that was initiated by three Minangkabau clerics or *ulamas*: Haji Sumanik, Haji Piobang, and Haji Miskin (Sumaniak, 2015). They studied in Masjid Haram from prominent teacher, Syeikh Muhammad Abdul Wahab. Their activities declined since Tuanku Imam Bonjol was arrested (A'la, 2008; and Zakariya & Salleh, 2011).

Today's, people of West Sumatera are superficial in faith and practice religion accord with *Sunnah* or words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad SAW. The duty of *Salafi* in West Sumatera, as officially stamped in the *Dar el-Iman* (Belief Domain) Foundation motto is put *Sunnah* as the light to enlighten the darkness of heresy (cited in Sefriyono, 2015:33).

In Padang Pariaman, although FPI (*Front Pembela Islam* or Islamic Defender Front), MMI (*Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia* or Indonesian *Mujahiddin* Council), and *Salafi* (Renewal of Islamic Thought) exist, the radical religious groups do not raise significantly. The groups are not based on

Nagari, a traditional governmental system in *Ranah Minang* or Minang Area. *Nagari* is *prototype* of government with traditional autonomy. The groups run courses in urban mosques and private *mushalla* (little mosque), where surrounded people are follower of the group (Nurdin, 2009; and Kamal, 2014).

Presence of MMI Padang Pariaman delegation in 4th MMI Congress bears evidence of MMI Padang existence. The congress is held at Az-Zikra Islamic Centre in Sentul Bogor, West Java, on August 23-25, 2013. MMI of West Sumatera delegations, who depart from Payakumbuh, are coming from Payakumbuh, Lima Puluh Kota, Kota Bukittinggi, Padang Panjang, Solok, Pariaman, and Kota Padang. Another proof of MMI existence in Padang Pariaman is the visit of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to *Pesantren* Darul Ulum in Pakandangan, Muhammadiyah's *pesantren* in the center area of *Tarekat of Syatariah*. Attendance of the MMI leader (*amir*) is result of MMI Padang board members coordination (interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015).

FPI is said to be existed in Padang Pariaman, due to the visit of the FPI top leader (*imam besar*), Muhammad Habib Rizieq Shihab, on 23 Oktober 2014, in *Mujahiddin* Mosque, Lubuk Alung, Padang Pariaman, for his *safari dakwah* or preaching series in West Sumatera. Through his speech, the *Imam* explains three modes of Muslim struggle, as following here:

[...] firstly, struggle in asking out. This mode of *da'wah* should be done in politeness and good manner; secondly, struggle in *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* – keep a stiff and assertive to affirm correct and incorrect; and thirdly, struggle in *jihād* – consign everything, including his live, for the glory of the religion of God.²

Salafi in Padang Pariaman is supported by Pariaman people, who practice *Salafism*

²See "Inilah Ajakan Ketua FPI Habib Rizieq Saat Safari Dakwahnya di Lubuk Alung". Available online at: <http://www.pariamantoday.com/2014/10/inilah-ajakan-ketua-fpi-habib-rizieq.html> [accessed in Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia: November 10, 2017]. About the methods of *dakwah* (preaching), please see comparatively also Egdunas Raciús (2004) and A.M. Ismatulloh (2015).

after shifted from *Tarekat of Syatariah* practices, for instant Zulkifli Zakaria and Ali Musri. Their religious radical practice is, borrowing Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (2010)'s term, radical in *furu'iyah* matters (Mufid, 2010). However, *tarekat* leaders worry about recurring, historically speaking, rivalry of *Padri* and *Tarekat* that happened in the past. Besides that, they also concern about the possibility of radicalism shifting into latent radicalism and manifest radicalism (Azwar, 2018).

Although latent radicalism is lack of power to resist, it will launch an attack whenever it has a power, even if it just a weak power. In sociology literatures, it is often called "manifest radical" (Berning, 2014; and interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015). Moreover, *Salafi* declares itself as extension of unfinished *Padri da'wah* (preaching of puritanism in Islam). By its *dakwah*, *Salafi* group insult *tarekat* (sufi order) practices and the leadership of *Tuanku* as religious figure, particularly by sermons that are broadcasted by local radio station, such as Radio of *Dara* (Virgin) in Kota Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia (Hakim, 2012).

Responding this, numbers of *Tuanku* have ever planned to make petition. In higher tension level, such as terrorism, there was a case of arrested terrorist who did not come from Padang Pariaman, but *Nagari* Simpang, Kampuang Pauh, *Nagari* Cimpago (interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015). In this context, Irvan Khairul Ananda (2015), as Chief of Kesbangpol (*Kesejahteraan, Pembangunan, dan Politik* or Political, Development, and Prosperity Affairs) in West Sumatera, said that Padang Pariaman vulnerable to religious radicalism, including terrorism (Ananda, 2015).

Edo, a resident of Simpang Kampuang Pauh, *Nagari* Cimpago in Padang Pariaman Regency was shot. Edo is accused for his part in preparing explosive to detonate Vihara Ekayana. Another West Sumatera resident engaged in terrorism is Beni Asri, member of Cirebon terrorist network, who was arrested by DENSUS (*Detasemen Khusus* or Special Detachment)

88 at his parent house in Koto Sani, Koto Singkarak Subdistrict, Solok Regency in West Sumatera. Among 19 Regencies in West Sumatera Province, the only two invulnerable Regencies are: Kota Pariaman and Kota Solok, the rest are vulnerable to radical terrorism (Ananda, 2015).

The condition worries *mamak ibadat* (a person who has authority in the field of Islamic religious service), *mamak adat* (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom), *pemerintah nagari* (government of a conglomeration of villages or settlements), and *tuanku* (royalty title or community leader), who keep *Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah* (Majority of Islamic Sunni)'s principles in Padang Pariaman. Syafri Tuanku Imam Sutan Sari Alam, as leader of MAZIS (*Majlis Zikir Istiqomah Syattariyah* or Council of Consistency *Zikir* for *Syattariyah* Sufi Order) said that for Padang Pariaman people, *Tuanku* is *palang pintu* (gate) or stanchion of religion for the society. In case of religious radicalism, *Tuanku* is the forefront man to exclude it, because *Tuanku* is the main figure who should talk to *umat* or Muslim people in grass-root level (Rimadany, 2016).

In West Sumatera Province level, religious radicalism appears in following religious attitudes: firstly, accusation of socio-patologist as PEKAT (*Penyakit Masyarakat*) by *Salafi* group to *tarekat* practices in Lima Puluh Kota Regency and Payakumbuh that triggers social conflict; secondly, in Kota Padang, *Salafi*, particularly *Yamani*, reject to come to the ballot box or TPS (*Tempat Pemungutan Suara*) in general election by saying that Indonesian democracy is Western system and unsuitable with Islamic system (Sefriyono, 2015:105); and thirdly, related to the case of Muhammad Kristiawan, a philosophy lecturer at the UMSB (*Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat* or West Sumatera Muhammadiyah University), who accused insulting *Al-Qur'an*, radical groups in Sumatera Barat, such as MMI (*Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia* or Indonesian *Mujahiddin* Council), *Paga Nagari Sumbar* (*Sumatera Barat* or West

Sumatera), *Komite Syariat Islam Indonesia Sumbar* (Indonesia Islamic Law Committee of West Sumatera), and MTKAAM (*Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau* or High Council of Minangkabau World Custom Deliberation) *Sumbar* held atonement for Muhammad Kristiawan at Nabawi Hotel in Padang, West Sumatera, on April 27, 2015 (Fadilah & Putra, 2015).³

Religious radicalism in *Nagari Sungai Buluah* mostly manifested in structural and cultural violence. Structural violence was happen when *Salafi* group detaches itself from other Islamic groups in the *Nagari*, because of its different appearance and religiosity. *Salafi* members do not intermingle with *tarekat* (Sufi order) of people, who are majority in *Nagari Sungai Buluah*. Meanwhile, *Salafi*'s cultural violence is blaming them, whom do not agree as heresy, particularly *tarekat* group (cf Galtung, 2005; and Salim, 2013).

Salafi religious forum concentrated on a mosque in the *Nagari*, namely *Masjid Jannatul Islam* (Islamic Paradise Mosque). The forum that held every day after *Maghrib* (evening) prayer is led by Ustadz Latiful Kabir, an alumna of LIPIA (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* or Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic). People around the mosque call him *Tuanku Kaciak*. He also alumnus of *Pesantren Salafiyah*, namely *Pesantren Lubuak Pandan* in Padang Pariaman. However, after complete his study in LIPIA, Ustadz Latiful Kabir turn to oppose *tarekat* groups. Some people accuse him as *Ustadz Sesat* (heretic Islamic teacher), because his speech blame *tarekat* practices, the practices that formerly he did (interview with Respondent B, 8/8/2017).

Recently, *Salafi* activities in *Jannatus Salam* (Peace Paradise) are disturbed after conflict between people of *Nagari Sungai Buluah* and *Salafi* happened. The conflict occurs since *Salafi* changes the *khutbah* (sermon) in *Jannatus Salam* from *Syattariyah* to *Salafi* way. Finally, *Mufti Nagari* (adviser

³See, for example, "Dosen Liberal Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat (UMSB) Penginjak Al-Qur'an Akhirnya Bertaubat" in www.MinangkabauNews.com, on 28 April 2015 [accessed in Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia: May 19, 2017].

on Islamic law in Regency level) and the Elder of KAN (*Kerapatan Adat Nagari* or Regency Custom Deliberation) remind the *Salafi ustadzs*. By the reminder, the *Salafi ustadzs* are prohibited to give sermon in that mosque (cf Shatzmiller, 2001; and Salim, 2013).

The control of the *Jannatus Salam* mosque is taken over by *Nagari*, it was the most displeased fact for *Salafi* group. After *Jannatus Salam* mosque being controlled by *Nagari* Sungai Buluah, *Salafi* is unable to develop their ideology. Because the tradition of *Nagari* is *tarekat of Syattariyah*, while *Salafi* is anti-*tarekat* (Manan, 2017; and interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

Nagari Sungai Buluah in Padang Pariaman. Sungai Buluah, the name is related to *buluah* tree (genus of bamboo) that grows in that place. It is specifically in *Kuliek*, the first region of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah.⁴ *Nagari* Sungai Buluah is a unique society. At least, there are two distinctive manners that they have. Firstly, it is the only *Nagari* in Padang Pariaman which accepts Christian and Catholic Nias Ethnic by customary law or *secara adat*. Christian and Catholic minority has right to build house of prayer in land of people (*tanah ulayat anak nagari*) that has been granted after Christian-Nias *maisi adat dan menuang limbago* as many other Muslim ethnics that did *malakok* (Sefriyono, 2014).

In this context, Sefriyono (2014) reveals that the process of *mengisi adat Minangkabau* by Nias ethnic has been done on Desember 10, 1927. In that process, Nias ethnic presents traditional tribute payment (*upeti adat*) 40 rial Padang. After that, the ceremony continued with *malewakan gala* (bestowing title) by *ninik mamak* (traditional leaders) in *Nagari* Sungai Buluah. The bestowed title is *Tuheneri Datuak Gapuak*. In *malewakan gala* ceremony, as many other *penghulu* (clan chief) in Minangkabau, the *penghulu* of Christian-Nias is also honored *saluak* (a kind of traditional hat) and traditional special suit of clothes for *penghulu*. By appointing *Tuheneri Datuak*

Gapuak as *penghulu*, the number of *penghulu* in the *Nagari* is summed up. As number of clans in *Nagari*, it previously has 16 *penghulus*, but now it becomes 17 *penghulus* (Sefriyono, 2014).

Melewakan gala traditional ceremony is not only to bestow the *Penghulu Tuheneri Datuak Gapuak*, but also *panungkek-panungkek* (the apparatus). The *Datuak-datuak penungkek* are *Datuk Rajo Mudo*, *Datuk Rajo Kaciak*, *Datuk Rajo Bungsu*, *Rang Mudo*, and *Tuo Kampung*. In addition, as Minangkabau ethnic has *mamak ibadat* or commonly known *labai*, Nias ethnic also has *labai* who is not similar with *labais* in Minangkabau (Frey, 1986; and interview with Respondent D, 16/8/2015).

Beside *penghulu*, traditional figures who give signature in the ceremony are *Katik Nagari*, *Imam Nagari*, *Labai Lingkung*, and *Muti Nagari* (Sefriyono, 2014). Inhabitants of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah are 17,563. Nias ethnic concentrated in Korong Tanjung Basung II. In *Nagari* Sungai Buluah, Christian-Nias people are 935. It is 5.33% of the total inhabitants that are 17,533. In Korong Tanjung Basung II, there are 715 Christian or 42.61% of 1.678 people, while the number of Muslim are 963 or 57.38%. Profile of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah explains that in order to assure religious right, two churches were built: the church *Banoa Krieso Protestan* for Protestant Christian and *Kristus Bangkit* for Catholic (cited in Sipayung, Gulo & Nurhuda, 2014; and Prayuda, 2015).

People of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah are loyal members of *tarekat* (Sufi order) of *Syattariyah*. In many interview opportunities with key persons of religious, tradition (*adat*), and *Nagari* apparatus revealed that Islamic held by people of Sungai Buluah is *Syattariyah* (Manan, 2017; and interview with Respondent D, 16/8/2015).

People of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah are very firm in holding *Syattariyah* tradition, when another current comes in; people have fast response by report it to *mamak ibadat* (a person who has authority in the field of Islamic religious service). Then,

⁴See "RPJM [Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah] Nagari Sungai Buluah, 2011-2015". *Unpublished Program Report*, owned by the authors.

mamak ibadat will discuss with *mamak adat* (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom) as early resolution before bring the case to *Mufti Nagari* (Islamic adviser in a conglomeration of villages or settlements). Then, *Mufti Nagari* will take the case to KAN (*Kerapatan Adat Nagari* or Regency Custom Deliberation), in which all clerics and prominent figures in *Nagari* are the board members (Zainuddin, 2008; and Panuh, 2012).

People of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah have sealed their heart with *Syattariyah* religious tradition. Their children are trained to accept the tradition. In this context, Datuk Lembang as Chief of KAN Sungai Buluah, in an interview, said as following here:

My parent hold pure *Syattariyah* religious tradition, when they saw my religious practices were different with them, they would ask me: "Sia guru ang?" or who is your teacher?

That is how *Syattariyah* people keep their religious tradition and heir it to their younger generation (interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

The strong relation of *Syattariyah* (one of Sufi orders) with Minangkabau cultural institution, both in the level of *kaum* (ethnic or community) and *nagari* (a conglomeration of villages or settlements), has become assets to preserve *anak nagari* (young generation) from radical religious ideology, such as *Salafi-Wahabi* (Renewal of Islamic Thought led by Muhammad ibn Wahab) movement and others (Sefriyono, 2015; and interview with Respondent H, 3/8/2015).

Indigenization Tarekat of Syattariyah in Minangkabau. The term *embedded* is often used by Azyumardi Azra (2015) to explain how Islam with vernacularization and indigenization patterns adhered to society. Vernacular means origin, while indigenious means native. The two terms indicate characters of Islamic *da'wah* (preaching) in Indonesian archipelago that was peaceful and accommodate the local culture by Sufism (Azra, 2015).

Quoting Anthony H. Johns (1995), Azyumardi Azra (2002) also explained that

the succeed of sufi in converting people to Islam in Melayu-Indonesia archipelago at least achieved in thirteen century is result of sufi ability in offering Islam that maintaining the continuity of local belief and practices rather than a revolution (cf Johns, 1995; Azra, 2002:33; and Suwirta, 2003).

Tarekat (Islamic sufi order) cannot be detached from *tasawuf* (Islamic sufism), because *tarekat* is institutionalized *tasawuf*. In *tasawuf*, personal religious manifestation is not institutionalized in a *tarekat* (Fathurahman, 2008:25). Among many *tarekats*, there is *tarekat of Syattariyah*. This *tarekat of Syattariyah* is very accommodating in its contact to culture and power. In its history, Shaikh Muhammad Gauth, lived around 970 AH (*Anno Hijriah*) / 1563 AD (*Anno Domini*), was the caliph of *tarekat Syattariyah*, who was wellknown as ulama who has closed friendship with Hindu figures (Azra, 2002; Suwirta, 2003; and Mufid, 2009).

Through his book, *Jawāhir al Khamsa* (the throne contains the five jewels), Shaikh Muhammad Gauth adopts *Yoga* (Buddha meditation) technic and practice as part of *zikir* or repeatedly chant part of the confession of faith in Islam's method (cited in Fathurahman, 2008:30). Not only to culture, *Syattariyah* clerics also accommodating local politics. Historically, Abdurrauf Ali al-Jawi, carrier of *tarekat of Syattariyah* to Melayu-Indonesia world, has ever been believed by Sultanah Syafiyatuddin (1645-1675) as *Qadi Malik al-'Adil* – religious scholar who responsible to social and religious affairs (in Fathurahman, 2008:34).

In West Sumatera, the complex relation between Islam and Minangkabau tradition results many kind of relations, including sosial conflicts, whether because of strict understanding on Islam that, therefore, lead to judgement on relation of *tarekat* and minangkabau tradition that unsuitable with strict Islamic utilitarianism, as Azyumardi Azra (2003:45-46) explained when talking about this relation; or whether it was competition of influence between traditional scholar and religious one as

identified by Christine Dobbin (1987).

Besides those possibilities, *tarekat of Syattariyah* is deep-rooted in the society. As many other traditional groups, *tarekat of Syattariyah* is also known tightly bound itself to traditional authority (Fathurahman, 2008:34). As *surau* (little mosque) tradition inheritant, *tarekat of Syattariyah*, since Syekh Burhanuddin era, make *surau* not only as religious institution but also traditional institution; although the practice is lessen today (Dobbin, 1987; Azra, 2003; Samad, 2003; and Fathurahman, 2008).

Duski Samad (2003), Oman Fathurahman (2008), and Uka Tjandrasasmita (2009) mentioned that deeprooted relation of *tarekat of Syattariyah* and Minangkabau tradition with the term *pribumisasi* or indigenizing. *Tarekat of Syattariyah* indigenizing is manifested in *Basafa* and *Salawat Dulang*. *Basafa* is pilgrimage ritual to graveyard of Syekh Burhanuddin Ulakan, great *Syattariyah* ulama in West Sumatera. *Basafa* is held annually in the tenth day of *Safar* month. Many people join the tradition, including common Muslim or non-*Syattariyah* members. *Tarekat of Syattariyah* indigenizing is also expressed in *Salawat Dulang* – a performance art by beating *dulang* or *talam* and chanting *shalawat Nabi* (invocation to Prophet). According to the traditional sources, the *shalawat Nabi* was firstly introduced by Syekh Burhanuddin Ulakan, when he saw art performance in Aceh that used *rebana* (tambourine). So, *Salawat Dulang* or *Salawat Talam* is still practiced today in Minangkabau (Samad, 2003; Fathurahman, 2008; and Tjandrasasmita, 2009).

Syattariyah Relation to Adat and Nagari Sungai Buluah. It is important to note here that *Syattariyah* (one of sufi orders) relation to Minangkabau *adat* (custom or tradition) and *nagari* (land) authority is very strong. The relation occurs in both *kaum* (ethnic or community) and *nagari* level. In the level of *kaum* is through *mamak ibadat* (elder of religious service) / *labai* (mosque official) of *tarekat of Syattariyah*; therefore, institutionalized in *surau* (little mosque) of *kaum*. The religious

authority in this level is *Labai*. There are 16 *suraus* in *Nagari Sungai Buluah*, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, as number of its clans (Azra, 2003).

While *Labai* is actually traditional identity, it is not religious title. Placement of *tuanku* (title of royalty or Islamic community leader) candidate as religious teacher in *surau* of *kaums* is result of agreement between *mamak ibadat* and *mamak adat* (elder of custom or tradition) in that *kaum*. The selection of religious teacher in a *surau* is based on religious tradition, particularly in *Nagari Sungai Buluah*, and commonly in Padang Pariaman. In other words, the *surau* teacher has to in line with *Syattariyah*. Otherwise, the teacher is possibly able to change the established tradition and trigger further dispute (Azra, 2003; Samad, 2003; Ashour, 2008; and Fathurahman, 2008).

In general, mosque and *surau*, whether it belongs to clan, *korong* (surroundings), or *nagari* in Padang Pariaman and particularly *Nagari Sungai Buluah*, it is controlled by *mamak ibadat* and *tuanku* candidate or senior student of *pesantren Salafiyah* (Islamic boarding school of reform movement). *Tuanku* candidate fullfiling the duty in a mosque or *surau* is under order of *ninik mamak kaum* or the elders in a clan/community to *pesantren* (Azra, 2003; Fathurahman, 2008; interview with Respondent E, 5/4/2015; and interview with Respondent H, 3/8/2015).

Appoint teachers from non-*Syattariyah* can change the established religious tradition, *nagari* society do not want it to be happened. Concerning this, there is Minangkabau aporism that is strongly believed by people: "*jalan jan sampai dialiah urang lalu dan cupak jan sampai diganti orang panggaleh*". It means that believed religious tradition (*Syattariyah*) should not be changed by stranger, who brings different religious tradition. Its including radical groups, such as *Salafi* or LDII (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia* or Indonesia Islamic Preaching Institution), who has tried to come in the *nagari* (Fathurahman, 2008; Wakhid, 2010; and interview with

Respondent F, 16/8/2015).

Based on *Surat Keputusan Keanggotaan KAN (Kerapatan Adat Nagari) Sungai Buluah, Periode 2011-2016* (Membership Decree of KAN [Regency Custom Deliberation] Sungai Buluah, for Period 2011-2016), in *nagari* level, *Syattariyah* institution consists of two types: it becomes part of KAN institution. The chief of the division of Development and Preservation *Adat Syarak* (Custom and Islamic Law) in KAN management is seated by *Syatariyah* figure, Tunaku Kuniang. The division members are *Khatib Nagari* or land preacher, *Imam Nagari* or leader of communal prayer, and *Bila Nagari* or land muezzin (Panuh, 2012).

At the *nagari* level also, *Shattariyah* figures occupy strategic positions in relation to religious authorities. Religious institutions at the *nagari* level, i.e. *Mufti Nagari* (Islamic law adviser in community) are also occupied by *Syattariyah* figures. These institutions have religious authority through their *fatwas* (advices or instructions) related to Islamic religious matters at the *nagari* level. *Fatwas* of *Mufti Nagari* became the basis for the KAN and *Nagari* governments in banning the religious activities of radical groups (Fathurahman, 2008; and Panuh, 2012). In this context, Datuk Lembang as Chief of KAN Sungai Buluah, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, is recorded in the interview as follows:

Mufti Nagari as the head of *mamak ibadat* has religious legality at the *nagari* level. Implementation of religious activities in the *nagari* must be permitted by *Mufti Nagari*. New religious streams coming to this *nagari* outside of established religious understandings should report to *Mufti*. So, *Mufti Nagari* with his apparatus, such as *nagari* priests, *bilal*, *khatib*, and *nagari labai* are entitled to decide whether or not the denominations should carry out their *da'wah* activities in the *nagari*.

Beside that, the permission to establish mosques, *mushalla*, and other places of worship must pass the *fatwa* of *Mufti Nagari* (interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

Preventing Religious Radicalism: From Surau to Nagari. The important question that the answer will be explored in this

paper is why radical religious groups as mentioned in the previous section are unable to grow and develop in, particularly Sungai Buluah, and generally in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia? The answer is there are some elements of local wisdom that live and they preserve, especially in responding to religious radicalism. These elements include: firstly, *bersurau kaum dan bermasjid nagari* or "must have *surau* (little mosque) at *kaum* (community ethnic) and have mosque at *nagari* (district or regency) level"; secondly, *bermamak ibadat dan bermamak adat* or "must have Islamic worship leader and custom or tradition's leader"; and thirdly, *bermufti nagari dan bernagari* or "must obey to the Islamic law adviser in the community and must have district or regency". The three aspects are gradually proceeding to manifest themselves in a peaceful coexistence of the peaceful *santri* (Muslim students)' society which is the main characteristic of the *Pancasila* (five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia) philosophy, which emphasizes unity, stability, security and harmony (cf Lukito, 1997; and Mukhibat, 2015:178).

Firstly, *Bersurau Kaum dan Bermasjid Nagari*. Based on some theoretical studies on religious radicalism, house of worship is the most potential space for the growth and development of religious radicalism. One of many religious deradicalization attempts is to control religious activity in house of worship. House of worship, such as mosques and *mushalla* (little mosque), are not only a place of prayer but also a place for the institutionalization of religious values, ranging from moderate to radical, which can be obtained through religious sermon held. The institutionalization of religion through sermon is also highly dependent on for whom and for what purposes religious ideology is institutionalized (Azra, 2003 and 2006; Ranstrop, 2009; and Salim, 2013).

In *Nagari* Sungai Buluah in particular, and in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera in general, *surau* and mosque cannot be used freely by any group and religious

group, including by those who are classified as radical. *Surau* and the mosque are integrated with *adat* (custom or tradition). Therefore, permission to use *surau* and mosque is not finished at *marbot* (caretaker of mosque) level. *Surau* is the property of the *kaum*, and regulated by *mamak ibadat* (worship leader). *Mamak ibadat* is a traditional institution that has authority in the field of *Syarak* (Islamic religious law). Because the use of *surau* and mosques in *Nagari* Sungai Buluah has been well controlled, the young generation of the clan received a religious education in the *surau* (Azra, 2003 and 2006; and Amir, 2008).

Traditionally, not only religious education has been obtained in *surau*, but also *adat* education. *Surau* of Sheikh Burhanuddin, in his history, taught Minangkabau people on Islamic religion and tradition at once in *surau*. After studying the *kitab* (book), the younger generation learn Minangkabau *adat*. Therefore, the *adat* and Islamic religious stakeholders are united in the institution of *surau* (Samad, 2003; and Yunas, 2005). The *Nagari* mosque basically belongs to the Minangkabau people, as *nagari* is an autonomous form of customary government. One of the requirements of the establishment of the *nagari* is the existence of a mosque (Amir, 2008).

In *Nagari* Sungai Buluah, as well as *surau*, mosques cannot be utilized by any group and religious stream. Not everyone can institutionalize religion in mosques and *surau*. Its use is governed by a *nagari* institution that holds *syarak*, namely *Mufti Nagari*. Only *Tuanku* (royalty title or Islamic community leader) and *Calon Tuanku* (candidate of royalty title or Islamic community leader), who is privilege to institutionalize religion in these two house of worship.⁵ The appointment of *Tuanku* or *Calon Tuanku* to become a religious teacher in *surau* is basically to minimize the occurrence of changes in the religious

traditions of society that have been in the tradition of *Syattariyah*. Changes in tradition will cause unrest in society (Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Rimadany, 2016).

Why should *Tuanku* who teaches religion in *surau* and *nagari* mosque? The answer, so that children in the *nagari* will not experience what the Minangkabau saying: *jalan jan sampai dialiah urang lalu, cupak jan sampai dituka urang panggaleh*. Concerning the teachings of religion, this proverb means: "when people in the *nagari* or people who have the same religious traditions teach religion, then taught will be in accordance with existing religious traditions". It would be different when the teacher is an outsider. Moreover, since they have understood the religious traditions of the people to be taught, then, the Minangkabau saying goes: *sesuai mor dengan baut* or "teaching will be appropriate and will not cause unrest and turmoil in society" (Lukito, 1997; Amir, 2008; and interview with Respondent F, 16/8/2015).

The tradition of *bersurau dan bermasjid* with the framework of the *Syattariyah* has become an obstacle to radical religious groups to institutionalize their religious ideology in *surau kaum* and *masjid nagari*. Besides the differences of ideology between these two religious groups, *surau* and mosque are not only religious identities but also cultural identities at once. The explanation based on the above data confirms that the deradication of the radicalism that emphasizes legal-formal and repressive approach, which has implemented by the government, need to be reviewed.⁶ This is because the logic of legal approach contradict the logic of terrorist (Mufid, 2009; and Mukhibat, 2015a dan 2015b).

Secondly, *Bermamak Ibadat dan Bermamak Adat*. *Nagari* Sungai Buluah has 16 tribes with 16 *penghulus* (Muslim leaders in village level). *Penghulu* of the tribe commonly called the *mamak adat*. *Mamak adat* is accompanied with *mamak ibadat*, which also

⁵See also "Tuanku: Garda Terdepan *Palang Pintu* Cegah Radikalisme Agama". Available online at: <http://www.berita9online.com> [accessed in Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia: May 13, 2017].

⁶See "Inilah Kelemahan Penanganan Terorisme di Indonesia". Available online at: www.jurnalparlemen.com [accessed in Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia: May 19, 2017].

16 people as well as *mamak adat*. *Mamak adat* is a person who has authority in the field of tradition – in Minangkabau term commonly called *urang adaik/adat*. While *mamak ibadat* is a person who has authority in religious field – usually called *urang mamcik syarak* or “people who hold religious law”. Therefore, everyone in the *Nagari Sungai Buluah* has two *mamaks* with their respective positions and roles (Lukito, 1997; Abidin, 2014; and Narny, 2016).

Each tribe in the *Nagari Sungai Buluah* also has a house of worship for the coaching and development of the religion of their young generation. According to the number of his tribe in *Nagari Sungai Buluah*, there are 16 *surau kaums* (ethnic or community little mosque). *Surau kaum* governed by *mamak ibadat* as *syarak* (Islamic law) holders. These arrangements include marriage, death, and religious education (Azra, 2003 and 2006; and Mawangir, 2015). Who will be the religious teacher and *wirid* (passage of *Al-Qur'an*)’s leader in the *surau kaum* is determined by the *mamak ibadat* through the deliberation of the *kaum* by involving the *mamak adat*, as explained by Datuk Sati, Vice Chairman of KAN (*Kerapatan Adat Negeri* or Regency Custom Deliberation) *Sungai Buluah*, for the following reasons:

Mamak ibadat is usually called *labai* here. They are called people who hold *syarak* (sharia) or *mamacik syarak*. Religious affairs administered by *mamak ibadat* are funeral, from bathing to ceremonies of one day to a hundred days commemoration. They also have representation in the *Kerapatan Adat Nagari* (KAN). *Mamak ibadat* at the tribal level is appointed by their tribe members through meetings, whilst the *labai lingkung* or *labai pegawai* is appointed by the *nagari* through the *nagari* meeting.

Each tribe has a *mamak ibadat*, because *mamak ibadat* is *mamak pusako*. Related to religious education for the people, *mamak ibadat* through meetings calling on *Tuanku* or *Calon Tuanku* to be able to teach reciting or *wirid* in their *surau kaum*. So, the existence of *Tuanku* or *Calon Tuanku* in *surau kaum* is not of their own will but at the request of *ninik mamak*. *Tuanku* or *Calon Tuanku* come from two *Salafiyah pesantrens* in Padang Pariaman district, namely *Pesantren Nurul Yakin* and *Pesantren Batang Kabuang*.

The possibility of religious groups institutionalizing their religious understanding

at *kaum* depends on the *mamak ibadat*, which of course is inseparable from the *mamak adat* as *karih sabilah payakan sakaki* or leader in their tribe (interview with Respondent G, 16/8/2015).

Religious activities at the tribe are very dependent on the religious authority held by *mamak ibadat*. It is because *surau* is not only a house of worship, but also a place of *adat* (custom or tradition). Possibility of radical religious groups institutionalize their ideology in the *surau kaum* very depend on the *mamak ibadat*, *mamak adat*, and *tuanku* (Lukito, 1997; and Abidin, 2014).

Thirdly, *Bermufti Nagari dan Bernagari*. In *Nagari Sungai Buluah*, religious activities in house of worship, such as *surau* (little mosque) and mosque, are well controlled. At the level of *kaum* (ethnic or community), the control is done by *mamak ibadat* and *tuanku*. In *nagari* is performed by *mufti nagari*. Nevertheless, the *mamak ibadat*, *tuanku*, and *mufti nagari* have no administrative power to prohibit the practice of radical religious activities in house of worship. This institution is only at the *fatwa* or advice or instruction for implementation of Islamic matters (Zein, 1999; Azra, 2006; and Abidin, 2014).

The *fatwas* become the basis for the *nagari* authority in giving permission or forbidding a religious group from carrying out religious activities in the *nagari*. Before the *fatwa* became the basis of the ban, *Mufti Nagari* communicates it first to *ninik mamak* through organizing KAN (*Kerapatan Adat Nagari* or Regency Custom Deliberation). So that the prohibition of radical religious activity is not done partially, but is an integrated effort involving *mamak ibadat*, *mamak adat*, *mufti nagari*, and *nagari* authority (Setiadi & Kolip, 2011:298-299; and Abidin, 2014).

Confirmation has also been made against the *Salafi* (renewel of Islamic thought and movement), who want to change the religious procession, especially the Friday prayer that has been commonly held in *Nagari Sungai Buluah*. The practice of the Friday prayer is common in the *Syattariyah* tradition by means of giving


sermon by *Mufti Nagari* or his *aparatus* before the sermon. After the sermon, then next sermon that commonly called *khutbah ayam* or chicken sermon (cf Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Jones, 2014).

It is Arabic sermon, and is in accordance with the provisions of *Syattariyah*. It is not a sermon delivered in Arabic or an Indonesian sermon translated into Arabic as done by *Salafi*. The *Salafi* who is none other than the son of the mosque board, who is studying in LIPIA (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* or Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic), replace the sermon with Arabic, in the sense of different with *Syattariyah* sermon tradition. The community or congregation that has been raised in the *Syattariyah* tradition realize the change and feels the change is contrary to the religious tradition that they have held for generations from their ancestors. So, this phenomenon caused unrest in society (Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Salim, 2013).

The case is reported to *Mufti Nagari*, because the *Jannatussalam* (peace paradise) mosque is a *nagari* mosque and because *Mufti Nagari*, in the *nagari* tradition of Sungai Buluah, is *urang nan ampek jinih*. Written warning is agreed to be given, after giving advice by *Mufti Nagari*. Before the letter signed by the Chairman of KAN is given, the pattern of *Salafi* (Islamic reform)-style preaching has changed. Therefore, the letter is not given (Amir, 2008; and Panuh, 2012).⁷

Prevention of religious radicalism through the media, especially through bulletins, has also been done in *Nagari Sungai Buluah* by banning the bulletin of HTI (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* or Liberation Party of Indonesia) and *Salafi*. Radical religious doctrines are also potentially

⁷See also "Surat Keputusan Keanggotaan Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) Nagari Sungai Buluah, Periode 2011 s/d 2016". *Unpublished Letter*, owned by the authors.



Matrix 1:
The Percentage Form of the Conversion Data
(Source: Sefriyono, 2015, p.137)

propagated by radicals through reading. Hence, reading is an important factor in the involvement of religious radicalism (cf Wildan, 2007; Anspaha, 2008; and Ranstrop, 2009).

Based on questionnaires filled by 61 pilgrims who are active in following *Salafi* studies, comencing to questions, "interested in *Salafi* after reading *Salafi* books and bulletin" obtained data in the form of frequencies: 13 people congregate strongly agree; 43 stated agreed; 1 person expressed doubt; and 4 people expressed disagreement.

Finally, it is interesting to note here that Sefriyono (2015), in his study pertaining *Salafi* group movement, has exposed the percentage form of the conversion data, as following here: 21.31% choose the option strongly agree or ST (*Sangat Setuju*); 70.49% choose the option agree or S (*Setuju*); 1.63% choose the option hesitate or R (*Ragu-ragu*); 6.55% choose no agreed or TS (*Tidak Setuju*); and 0% who voted strongly disagree or STS (*Sangat Tidak Setuju*). This evident is shown in the matrix 1.

CONCLUSION

The prevention of religious radicalism based on social culture is rarely empowered in the handling of religious radicalization. Basically, social practices developed in the society are more effective, because they are built from local awareness and culture.

So that the de-radicalization effort is not in the mind of the state, but is in the mind of society. The two important things for the prevention of religious radicalism are the control of religious activity in house of worship and educational institutions; and also the control of the use of funds from radical groups against religious institutions and religious organizations.

In reality, local communities also have their own religious radicalism prevention mechanisms similar by exploiting their local wisdoms. People of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, for example, has succeeded in counteracting radical religious group activities by empowering the role of *mamak ibadat* (a person who has authority in Islamic religious field) and *mamak adat* (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom) on the basis of their *suraus kaum* (ethnic or community little mosque) in arranging their house of worship. At the *nagari* (regency or district) level, the *nagari* people have *Mufti Nagari* (Islamic law adviser in the regency or district level), who acts as *fatwas* (advice or instruction for implementation of Islamic matters) giver of whether or not certain religious groups institutionalize their religious beliefs in the *nagari*.

This *fatwa* is the basis for the *nagari* authority in banning the activities of radical religious groups. About the funding as a source of religious radicalization, *nagari* has its own fund-raising ways without relying on funds sourced from radical religious groups. With regards to the control of radical bulletins as a source of religious radicalism, the *suraus* and mosques of the *nagari* with their religious beliefs became the basis for banning the bulletins. Through institutionalization of *Syattariyah*, people do not want to read bulletins that are religiously different from their ideology.

Besides, through *Mufti Nagari* and *adat* institutions, these radical bulletins are not allowed to circulate in the *kaum* and *nagari* mosques. People of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah firmly hold their religious culture. Cultural power is a powerful tool for preventing

religious radicalism. The deradicalization can be done with cultural strength. The strength of charismatic leadership can also serve as a towing carriage of deradicalization. *Tuanku* (royalty title or Islamic community leader) at *Nagari* Sungai Buluah became a religious leader, who is still obeyed by the *nagari* community.

Tuanku is the main resource person for the people of *nagari* in solving their religious problems. *Suraus* and mosques of *kaum* are nurtured by *Tuanku*, all their religious affairs are handed over to *Tuanku*, including the present of radical religious groups. So, the people of *Nagari* Sungai Buluah hold a Minangkabau proverb: *dagang batapatan dan rantau balabuhan* – newcomers in this case is new religious groups coming to the Sungai Buluah River are obliged to report their religious activities to the *nagari* religious leaders, namely *Mufti Nagari*; and *Mufti Nagari* must hold *Tuanku*.⁸

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⁸ **Statement:** Herewith, we affirm that this article is our original work and not a product of plagiarism, and that the article has not been submitted, reviewed, or published in another scholarly journal. Upon acceptance for publication, we will not withdraw my manuscript from the *SOSIOHUMANIKA* journal.

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