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The September 30th Movement and Aftermath in Indonesian Collective Memory and Revolution: A Lesson for the Nation

**ABSTRACT:** The G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) in 1965 was a largest national tragedy since the Republic of Indonesia had gained its independence on August 17th, 1945. It was a darkness episode in Indonesian collective memory and revolution towards a democratic state. It also still remains a lot of problems, both before and aftermath. This study is a historical analysis to the movement focused on the rivalry between the three pillars of Indonesian political power; anatomy of the movement and massacre's aftermath; and the national socio-political change's aftermath under the New Order regime rule. The study showed that, socio-politically, the G-30-S of 1965 was a rivalry of Indonesian political powers between the TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat or Indonesian National Military-Army), the PKI (Partai Komunis Indoensia or Indonesian Communist Party), and President Soekarno. The success of the Indonesian Military, under General Soeharto, in winning the rivalry had brought further consequences to changes in political systems, structures, and processes and Indonesian government for a period of 30 years. How the movement lives in collective memories of the nation, and how Hannah Arendt (1970 and 1998)'s perspectives on the meaning of “forgiveness” as the state's ethical policy to find a humanitarian solution for the G-30-S of 1965's victims and perpetrators were also discussed. Hopefully, the paper can give an important meaning of the events to the citizenship education for next generations, so they are more thoughtful in addressing the nation’s history.

**KEY WORDS:** September 30th Movement of 1965; Memory; Indonesian Revolution; Forgiveness and Reconciliation.

**INTRODUCTION**

Since Indonesia gaining independence, on 17th August 1945, revolutions to realize a democratic state is not over, especially in relation with the national leadership succession. The fact, three of six periods of the succession were characterized by a “loud succession” or “revolution”, either through a bloody movement, people’s power, or an impeachment. The GESTAPU (Gerakan September 30) or G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement)
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in 1965 was one of the national tragedies, which had a major impact to Indonesian people in the next periods. Even, Indonesian historians committed, besides the G-30-S of 1965 movement, there are no important events in the history of modern Indonesia are still debatable (Mulder, 2000; Suwirta, 2000; Kahin, 2013; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

In Indonesian history, the G-30-S of 1965 movement was related to twentieth-century darkness of Indonesia, a labyrinth of heartbreaking memories that breed unanswerable questions. It was one of the “the unsolved riddles of Indonesian history in the twentieth century” (Boden, 2007:507). It was the most mysterious event, an unsolvable and impenetrable murder for historians, whose solution had profound implications for Indonesia’s national history. The G-30-S of 1965 movement involves various interests and political propaganda of the parties, the political scene intricates, and the suspect nature of much of the evidence (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Suwirta, 2000; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sucipto, 2013; and Adam, 2018).

M.C. Ricklefs (1981), and other scholars, also asserted that the movement was an intricate of the political scene and the suspect nature of much of the evidence, make firm conclusions about the movement nearly impossible. Because it was actions clandestinely plotted by military officers, intelligence operatives, and double agents, a historian’s usual sources of information — newspapers, magazines, government records, and pamphlets — were of little help (Ricklefs, 1981; Adam, 2007 and 2008; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; and Sucipto, 2013). In this context, A. Sumarwan (2007) stated also as follows:

[…] 1965 massacres were an event that never clearly explained why […] be a puzzle to me, for many people, not just my generation, but also for the generation of my parents (Sumarwan, 2007:19).

So that, anything interpretation or question of the event will never find a definitive answer, it is still in a mystery. If further evidence is not found, the final truth never will be known for ever (Suwirta, 2000; Sundhaussen, 2006; Adam, 2008; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sucipto, 2013; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

RESEARCH METHOD

The study uses a historical analysis method involve the collection and a critical analysis of all secondary sources of text, such as: memoir, testimony, textbooks, academic journals, (auto)biographies, daily newspaper, news/reports, etc. to establish relationships between cause and effect of the movement. This study is, especially, focused on the rivalry between the three pillars of Indonesian political power; anatomy of the movement and massacre’s aftermath; and the national socio-political change’s aftermath under the New Regime rule (Notosusanto, 1978; Sjamsuddin, 2007; Zed, 2008; Buckley, 2016; and Wasino & Hartatik, 2018).

How the movement and aftermath live in the collective memories of the nation, it will be analyzed and interpreted using the conception of P. Bourdieu (1989) on "symbolic struggle", to find a humanitarian solution for the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965’s victims; and perpetrators will be analyzed and interpreted using Hannah Arendt (1970 and 1998)’s perspective on the meaning of “forgiveness” as the state’s ethical policy (cf Arendt, 1970 and 1998; Bourdieu, 1989; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Road to the Movement: The Triangular Rivalry.

Without ignoring the factors of foreign conspiracies and Cold War period (1945-1991), which had proposed by experts (Scott, 1985; Keys & Cottille, 2017; Adam, 2018; Leksana, 2018; and Robinson, 2018), the paper regards that the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965’s movement was a climax of the rivalry between the three pillars of Indonesian political powers — Indonesian Military or TNI-AD/ABRI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat/Angkatan Bersenjata Indonesia); President Soekarno; and the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) — to attain political power after the General Election in 1955 (Crouch, 1986; Feith, 1995 and 1999; and Munsi, 2016).
At that time, position and role of President Soekarno were so powerful after 13 years of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1959) excluded by parties’ power. President Soekarno had become a balancing power between the PKI and TNI-AD, and he had enabled to intervene on the PKI and TNI-AD internal affairs. The PKI, that had “marginalized” since the Madiun Affair in 1948, returned to the national politics after they were success to become the winner in the General Election of 1955, and one of the four largest parties in Indonesia. Even, President Soekarno had also been given to them a great chance to become the main party, which dominated Parliament and military (Magenda, 1985; Feith, 1999; Anderson, 2003; Sundhaussen, 2006; Poeze, 2011; Sugiyama, 2011; and Adams, 2014).

Meanwhile, the TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat or Indonesian National Military-Army), which had marginalized by the political parties during the era of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1959) cannot more participated actively and directly in politics processes. On the one hand, it had made the military as a group excluded from political roles; and, on the other hand, the military had allowed to build a powerful internal cohesion and integration (Magenda, 1985; Crouch, 1986; Feith, 1995; and Munsi, 2016).

A.H. (Abdul Haris) Nasution was the main architect for building and strengthening the Indonesian military role in politics, since the 1950s (cf Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006; and Anwar, 2018). In his analysis on the General Election of 1955, D. Dhakidae (1985) suggested as follows:

*[..] the whole analyses to view the distribution of parliamentary parties were not meaningful, when the President and military factors simultaneously waging to war against the party [...] and since then, every aspect of national politics cannot be separated from the triangular rivalry between Sukarno-PKI-Military (Dhakidae, 1985:214).*

President Soekarno and TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat or Indonesian National Military-Army) had been successful to dissolve of political parties’ power, after Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet (1956-1957) in a crisis; and also after President Soekarno decreed back to the Presidential system and conceived of the Guided Democracy based on the politics of and NASAKOM (Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme or Nationalism, Religion, and Communism) in 1959. Although President Soekarno’s conception on the NASAKOM was opposed by the TNI-AD and right-wing Islamic groups, however, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) supported it. For PKI, NASAKOM provided more opportunities to build a closer relationship with President Soekarno for influencing the national policies; gaining leadership positions in the Ministry Cabinet, Parliament or DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong or House of Representatives-Mutual Cooperation), the Executive Board of the National Front, and Local Officials; and dissolving all anti-Communist organizations/parties (Sastroamidjojo, 1974; Feith, 1995; Sundhaussen, 2006; Cenne, 2016; and Winata, 2017).

These factors had become PKI as a very important political party and powerful in Indonesia; and President Soekarno’s policies were more left leaning. After President Soekarno revoked the SOB (Staat van Oorlog en Beleg or State in War and Emergency) in 1962, the PKI began to launch a campaign on NASAKOMISASI, or a process of NASAKOMISM, into the Indonesian military body, including to the TNI-AD, by putting political advisers on every command; and mobilize and recruit intellectuals, students, workers, and peasants as new members (Feith, 1995; Sundhaussen, 2006; Arif et al., 2010; Cenne, 2016; and Winata, 2017).

The PKI also supported to President Soekarno in confrontation against Malaysia to create a radical atmosphere in society; strengthen their position in national politics; and weaken the Indonesian military power. Even, they were supported by President Soekarno proposed to establish the Angkatan Kelima (Fifth Force), besides the Indonesian Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police. This force
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consisted of PKI cadres, and sympathizers were armed. However, it was never approved by the Indonesian military, particularly TNI-AD, until the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) was happened in 1965 (Crouch, 1986; Sundhaussen, 2006; and Irshanto, 2019).

The TNI-AD under A.H. (Abdul Haris) Nasution’s role had also been able to build and expand their political roles more focused. The first moment was when A.H. Nasution had been successful in establishing the IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Indonesian Independence Supporters Association) after he was dismissed by President Soekarno as a KSAD (Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat or Chief of Indonesian Army Staff) caused by his failure to prevent the 17th October 1952’s Affair. In 1955, when A.H. Nasution reappointed as a KSAD, he had fought back to realize a greater role for the Indonesian military in politics (Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; and Maulana & Santosa, 2019).

To prevent A.H. Nasution—military became too powerful, President Soekarno appointed him as a Deputy Minister of Defense in 1960s, so A.H. Nasution can be controlled easily; and carried out a divide et impera (divided and ruled) strategy between the Indonesian Army with the Air Force. To control the authority of the Ministry of Defense, President Soekarno also strengthened the autonomy of the Air Force by incorporating the Air Force and Police as part of the Indonesian Armed Forces. President Soekarno also strengthened the position of Chief of Air Force Staff and Police by incorporating them into the Ministry as Minister Ex-Officio that responsible directly to the President as Commander in Chief (Nasution, 1985; Notsosusanto, 1985:25; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006:254-255; and Cenne, 2016).

Facing the President Soekarno’s strategy, A.H. Nasution and Indonesian Military-Army supported by IPKI, PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Party) and PKI persuaded President Soekarno to build the National Front. When President Soekarno established a National Council (Dewan Nasional), an extra-parliament council built in 1957, A.H. Nasution also successfully incorporated Indonesian Military-Army and Police officers, and himself as ex-officio members of the National Council. In 1958, A.H. Nasution proposed to President Soekarno to implement the SOB (Staat van Oorlog en Beleg or State in War and Emergency) to ease tensions between the President and the Indonesian Military-Army, and he also suggested a “participatory policy” for Indonesian Military-Army well-known as the “Middle Way” (Jalan Tengah) or “Broad Front” (Front Lebar), particularly for the TNI-AD (Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006; Cesnna, 2016; and Setyahadi, 2018).

Ideologically, the concept of “Middle Way” came from the Indonesian Military-Army claimed that it was their historical rights to participate in politics. It was the “share holder of revolution”, so that the Indonesian Military-Army cannot just be placed as a “civil apparatus” or a “military regime”. And when President Soekarno declared about “back to the UUD (Undang-Undang Dasar or Constitution) 1945”, through the President Decree on 5th July 1959, was also based on A.H. Nasution—Indonesian Military-Army proposed and supported. Then, A.H. Nasution suggested that Indonesian Military-Army should be neutral in General Elections and political parties to avoid politicization; and their membership in parliament as a “functional group” conducted by the President Soekarno appointment (Nasution, 1985; Notsosusanto, 1985:23; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006:299; and Hamid, 2012).

Up to this point, A.H. Nasution—Indonesian Military-Army had successfully placed their representative in government/ministry, legislative, and in almost every state agency. According to U. Sundhaussen (2006), and other scholars, this success had enabled for A.H. Nasution to establish the Indonesian Military-Army as the most important part of the national administration in Indonesia; and had outlined a pattern for cooperation among President Soekarno – Indonesian Military-Army to bury the parliamentary

Since the time, President Soekarno – PKI – TNI-AD position were stronger, but the rivalry among of them became more heated. Each of them sought to organize and fight influence, strategy, or power and/or to weak and compete, but they also needed each other to support their own political interests. Special to PKI, the Indonesian Military-Army still regarded it as a "domestic enemy and external enemy agents" (Feith, 1995; Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006:247; Hamid, 2012; and Muni, 2016).

U. Sundhaussen (2006), and other scholars, stated again, in fact, since 1957 up to the beginning of the 1960s, the difference in the opinion between President Soekarno and A.H. Nasution—Indonesian Military-Army was vitriolic. Even, if there was a coalition of them, it was only based on the partial adjustment of the interests of political, ideological, personal, and material. However, both were agreed to abolish parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. In the line with growing of President Soekarno’s power supported by the PKI and the Indonesian Air Force, he can intervene into the Indonesian Military body further. Gradually, President Soekarno reduced A.H. Nasution’s power over the Indonesian military; and regarded A.H. Nasution as the “architect who has forged the political role of the Indonesian military” (cf Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006:284; Lev, 2009; and Ladang, 2016).

Finally, in 1962, A.H. Nasution was replaced by Major General Ahmad Yani as a KSAD (Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat or Chief of Army Staff); and, then, A.H. Nasution was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces or KSAB (Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata) under President Soekarno’s authority as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. On the one hand, it had dissolved of all his rules and authorities over the military and very harms to the military interests. On the other hand, it had been given an advantage to President Soekarno and the PKI to control of the Indonesian Military power (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006; Disjarahad, 2013; and Setyahadi, 2018).

However, President Soekarno’s tactics to weaken the Indonesian Armed Forces, it seemed not entirely successful. Ahmad Yani, who replaced A.H. Nasution, had a smart strategy to re-attack the weakening tactic of President Soekarno. Ahmad Yani replaced a number of top officers in the Indonesian Army body and promoted officers, who opposed and hostile to President Soekarno and anti-Communist or PKI. Among them was Brigadier General Soeharto, who assigned as Commander of KOSTRAD (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat or Army Strategic Reserves Command), a very strategic position in the Indonesian Army, which was can take over the Indonesian Army command if a KSAD was in absent (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Elson, 2001; Sundhaussen, 2006; Disjarahad, 2013; Adams, 2014; and Setyahadi, 2018).

Ahmad Yani also replaced the pro-Communist officers to the unimportant positions; reorganized the Regional Army Commando up to the village level; strengthened Army positions in Local Governments (Provincial and District); implemented the Operasi Karya (Work Operation) from the central to local level; and established a system of HANSIP (Pertahanan Sipil or Civil Defense) in Indonesia. All the policies he had taken to compensate and stemed PKI efforts for strengthening their position in the regions (Sundhaussen, 2006; Disjarahad, 2013; and Anwar, 2018).

In the context of the historical above, at least there were four interrelated opinions in the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movenemt) of 1965. Firstly, the G-30-S of 1965 was a revolt of fanatic left wing officers in the Indonesian Army Body under Colonel Untung command (under President Soekarno support/ command?) and Air Force officers who have indoctrinated Nasakomism by PKI. They used issues on the news about the efforts of Indonesian Military-Army officers group of "capitalist-bureaucrats" known as Dewan Jenderal (General Council) of
the Indonesian Armed Forces that will do “counter-revolution” to overthrow and kill the President Soekarno. This opinion was reinforced by the “evidences” exposed in the MAHMILUB (Mahkamah Militur Luar Biasa or Extraordinary Military Court) and Gilchrist letter document (Crouch, 1973; Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Beise, 2004; Sundhaussen, 2006; and Keys & Cottle, 2017).

Secondly, the G-30-S of 1965 was not so much “movement” against the government, but an attempt to force President Soekarno’s hand within the existing governmental structure. The basic aim of the movement was to arrest the Indonesian Army’s Generals, who were believed to be plotting against the President Soekarno; in the hope that he would, then, be able to take action against them. The G-30-S of 1965 was organized by the PKI to movement of the top command of the Indonesian Army to eliminate its major competitor for power, and replaced President Soekarno by a PKI’s candidate using issues on the plausibility of President Soekarno’s sudden death or permanent paralysis (Notosusanto, 1985; Fic, 2005; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Purdey, 2011; and Sucipto, 2013).

Thirdly, the G-30-S of 1965 was an internal conflict within the Indonesian Military-Army that caused by a dissatisfaction expression of “progressive” middle-officers of Indonesian Military-Army in Central Java (Diponegoro Division) to their officers in headquarter, who called as the “cosmopolitan-elitist”, and their mismanagement policies for those who had struggled to the liberation of West Irian. The conflicts more compounded by outside forces, which were considered to have hindered the development and integration of the Indonesian Military (Anderson, McVey & Bunnel, 1971; Crouch, 1973; Sundhaussen, 2006; Pour, 2010; and Purdey, 2011).

Fourthly, the G-30-S of 1965 was a movement organized by Soeharto and anti-Communist Generals group through double agents, e.g. Sjam Kamaruzaman, in order to provide a pretext for attacking the PKI and overthrowing President Soekarno (Wertheim, 1970; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; and Adam, 2018). The strong positions of the President Soekarno were supported by PKI, and the presence of the senior Indonesian Army Generals did not allow Soeharto to seize power directly. Soeharto had made the G-30-S of 1965’s movement as a “pretext” to create a national emergency and overthrow President Soekarno (Dake, 2005; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; and Adam, 2018).

Recently, this opinion associated with the theory of Creeping Movement, which was revealed in the memoir’s testimony of Subandrio, a former Foreign Minister of Guided Democracy in 1960s (cf Subandrio, 2000; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sundhaussen, 2006; Adam, 2010, 2012 and 2018; Widodo, 2012; and Setyahadi, 2018). Even, in his memoirs, Subandrio (2000) wrote as following here:

[…] July 3, 1946’s coup was a movement that failed; the G-30-S of 1965 movement was the beginning of a successful creeping movement […] and the beginning of a series Suharto’s victories in a creeping movement. Letter of Authorization (Supersemar) that received by Suharto was also the first. Why it should in the four stages? The answer is that before the G-30-S of 1965, Suharto was not an unimportant officer […] also a disability officer […].

Actually, creeping movement was not a Suharto’s choice […], this was a forced choice. Suharto cannot perform simply to get the top of the national leadership. He must pass the senior Generals and dealing with President Sukarno,
who was so strong [...]. The Creeping Horse is a bloody man. First, the Generals’ blood murdered on October 1, 1965. Second, Gains and Supardjo’s blood manipulated. Third, Sjam Kamaruzzaman’s blood betrayed. Fourth, blood of millions of Communists, sympathizers, their families, workers, and farmers murdered (Subandrio, 2000:35-36, 56 and 72).

**Anatomy of the G-30-S of 1965 Movement.** The G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) was occurred on September 30th, 1965, in Jakarta, Central Java, and Yogyakarta. In Jakarta, the Indonesian Military consisted of a Cakrabirawa (the President Guard) under Lieutenant Colonel Untung, two platoons of KODAM JAYA (Komando Daerah Militer Jakarta Raya or Great Jakarta Military Regional Command)’s garrison under Colonel Abdul Latif, and the Indonesian Air Force battalion of the Halim Air Base under Major Soejojo (Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; and Adam, 2018).

In addition, there were ten companies of the Battalion 454 of Central Java and Battalion 530 of East Java, units of the Para-Commando troops, and the Police Forces. These troops were the main group for occupying Merdeka (Independent) Square in Central Jakarta. Besides that, there were two thousand members of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) and its mass organizations, such as the PR (Pemuda Rakyat or People’s Youth) and GERWANI (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia or Indonesian Women’s Movement) coordinated by Sjam Kamaruzzaman (Sjam), Supono Marsudidjojo (Pono), and Dipa Nusantara Aidit (Aidit) as a Chairman of the PKI from the Special Bureau (Fic, 2005; Collins, 2009; and Munsi, 2016).

In Jakarta, the G-30-S of 1965’s troops totally estimated 4,130 people, consisted of 2,130 Armed personnel and 2,000 Civilians, who had received a brief training on military in Halim. In Central Java, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Solo, and Salatiga, they consisted of local troops backed by Armed Civilian and various youths organizations supporting PKI (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Cribb ed., 1991; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Arta, Purnawati & Pageh, 2017; and Adam, 2018).

The G-30-S of 1965’s troops were divided into two groups. The first was centralized in the Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) area, about seven miles in south of Merdeka Square in Central Jakarta. Their main duty was to kidnap the six Indonesian Army Generals as the members of the Dewan Jenderal (General Council). The Generals murdered and entered into an old well in the Lubang Buaya area. The second was centralized in the Merdeka Square in Central Jakarta. Their main duty was to neutralize and block the centers of state power, such as the Presidential Palace, Military Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, and the USA (United States of America) Embassy. It was also to take over the Radio Station and the Center of Telecommunications’ building. In addition, there was a troops group centralized in residential areas around the Halim Air Force Base, a location of the Central Command of G-30-S of 1965 (Collinson, 2009; Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

The G-30-S of 1965’s movement successfully carried out their missions and control to Jakarta only seven hours, from 04:00 to 11:00 AM (Ante Meridiem). In Semarang, Solo, and Salatiga in Central Java, they have occupied a local radio station, but there was no kidnapping or murdering of the Indonesian Army Territorial Officers. However, in Yogyakarta, they have kidnapped and murdered two Army Territorial Officers. They have also surrounded the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Kepatihan (Vice Regent Place), and a radio station in Yogyakarta (Anderson, McVey & Bunnel, 1971; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sucipto, 2013; and Adam, 2018).

After the humanitarian tragedy at the Lubang Buaya area in an early month of October 1965, a very large tragedy broken. Brigadier General Soeharto, a KOSTRAD (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat or Army Strategic Reserves Command)’s Commander, and Indonesian Armed Forces occupied to Merdeka Square in Central Jakarta; re-taken the Radio Station, Telecommunications’ building, Halim Air Force Base, and the Lubang Buaya area. Then, Brigadier General Soeharto announced
through the Radio Station on September 30th Movement of 1965’s event (Elson, 2001; Collinson, 2009; Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; and Adam, 2018).

The facts, according to John Roosa (2006 and 2008), and other scholars, that since the sound of Soeharto’s voice on the air marked the symbolic end of the G-30-S of 1965’s movement (Wertheim, 1970; Roosa, 2006:58 and 2008; Pour, 2010; Sucipto, 2013; and Adam, 2018). The next, Soeharto’s operation was the pursuit and cleansing anyone who involved in the G-30-S of 1965’s event, and destruction of the PKI bases in Central Java, East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra. The operation supported by vigilantes, civilian mass from the political opponents of PKI, and anti-Communist youth groups with weapons supplied by Indonesian Military-Army (Cribb ed., 1991; Farid, 2005; MLM-RSG, 2007; Munsi, 2016; and Arta, Purnawati & Pageh, 2017).

It was not known exactly how many people were killed. The earliest version as announced by President Soekarno in January 1966, the number of murders was 87,000 people (Cribb ed., 1991; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; and Adam, 2018). In 1966, the USA (United States of America) State Department estimate placed the figure at 300,000. Official Indonesian data released in the mid-1970s placed the number of deaths between 450,000 and 500,000 victims. In 1976, Admiral Sudomo, the Head of the Indonesian State Security System, said larger than 500,000 had been murdered. The Amnesty International had quoted one source placing the number killed at 700,000 and another at “many more than one million” (cf AI, 1977; Cribb ed., 1991; Beech, 2017; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

The people of the world will never forget and forgive this horrendous crime against the people. This did not include the tens of thousands of people were tortured and imprisoned in concentration camps and isolation found in almost all parts of Indonesia. Even, Indonesian activists estimated the number at from one to three million people, and about 10,000 of PKI cadre and supporters. The massacres, which were most intense in Central Java, East Java, and Bali, spread to Aceh in Northern Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan (AI, 1977; Cribb ed., 1991; MLM-RSG, 2007; Beech, 2017; and Adam, 2018).

The Time magazine, on 17th December 1965, illustrated that the massive killings have caused serious sanitation problems in North Sumatra, where the humid air bears the reek of decayed flesh, small rivers, and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies; river transportation had at places been seriously impeded (cited in Ransom, 1975; AI, 1977; Cribb ed., 1991; Roosa, 2006:58 and 2008; MLM-RSG, 2007; and Adam, 2018).

In the context of this massacre, there were two profound conclusions about it. Firstly, the mass killings just seemed to have happened without any one particular person or institution being responsible. The Indonesian killings can be categorized as “an anomalous of accidental mass death” (cf Cribb ed., 1991:16; Cribb, 2001; Sulistyo, 2003; Roosa, 2006:24 and 2008; and Adam, 2018). The mass killings had been attributed by frenzied mobs rampaging through villages and urban neighborhoods (Cribb, 2001; Sulistyo, 2003; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Roosa & Nevis, 2016; and Adam, 2018).

It was a horizontal, spontaneous violence, or a volatile, primitive people prone to violence (Sulistyo, 2003; Farid, 2005; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Roosa & Nevis, 2016; and Adam, 2018). If their analysis was correct, the killing act confirmed the existence of an Hannah Arendt (1970)’s violence model, and other scholars, was properly called Niemand Herschaft (Nobody Dominion), the rule by nobody, violence politics by many hands, so who should be responsible was uncertain. For the rule by nobody was not no-rule, and where all were equally powerless, we have had a tyranny without a tyrant. That the state there was nobody left with whom one could argued, to whom one could presented grievances, on whom the pressures of power could be exerted (cf Arendt, 1970; Budiardjo, 1996; Bartov ed., 2000; Budiawan, 2000; and Robinson, 2018).

Secondly, unlike the previous views, G. Leksana (2018); G.B. Robinson (2018);
and other scholars, stated that the killing was rather than inevitable or spontaneous, the mass killings and detentions were encouraged, facilitated, directed, and shaped by the Indonesian Army's leadership. It was a repertoire of violence, rather than psychological explanations of mass violence. The repertoire referred to routines of violence learned and employed by all of those associated with military institutions (Marching, 2017; Leksana, 2018; McGregor, Melvin & Pohlman eds., 2018; Melvin, 2018; and Robinson, 2018).

The mass killings could not have happened without the Indonesian Army's interference. Although the Army's role differed cross-regionally, due to the capacities of their regional leaders, the violence eventually escalated due to the mobilization of civilian groups by the Army and the usage of propaganda and media campaigns, including religiously inspired tactics. In this context, A. Keys & D. Cottle (2017), and other scholars, also suggested that the Indonesian Army was at the centre of the mass killings, through the Army's role in both the instigation and the organisation of the killings, but it is important to note that this was not simply a case of the Indonesian Military-Army carrying out a slaughter of alleged Communists (Keys & Cottle, 2017:341; Melvin, 2018; and Robinson, 2018).

**Political Changes in the New Regime, 1968-1998.** The G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, had been part of the history of the Indonesian revolution, which always will be remembered by all Indonesia people as one of the most dramatic events of the nation of Indonesia. It has also changed the entire of political constellation in Indonesia. The following description was focused on the most political changes in the domestic affairs consisted of the system of party; General Elections; Parliament, i.e. DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representatives) and MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly); Governance; and Security and Order Policy (Suwirta, 2000; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Pour, 2010; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

After Soeharto successfully quelled the G-30-S of 1965’s movement, then, he received a SUPERSEMAR (Surat Perintah 11 Maret or March 11th Warrant) of 1966 from the President Soekarno: to take any action it deemed necessary to guarantee security, peace, and stability of the government and the revolution; to ensure Soekarno’s safety and authority as the President/Supreme Commander/Leader of the Revolution/MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara or Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly)’s Mandatory; to sake the National Integrity and the Republic of Indonesia; and to execute all Sukarno’s teachings as Pemimpin Besar Revolusi or the Great Leader of the Revolution (LAI, 1998; Adam, 2006; and Wardaya, 2007).

Based on the SUPERSEMAR of 1966, Soeharto had taken important actions to PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) and President Soekarno. The PKI and its mass organizations, for example, dissolved and declared as a banned party/organization in all parts of Indonesia. While in 1967, the MPRS was revoked Soekarno’s authority as Presiden Seumur Hidup (President for Life) and declared that President Soekarno was unable to meet his responsibilities constitutionally and to implement the outlines of state policy and the MPRS’s decisions. MPRS also prohibited President Soekarno to be active participate in politics until General Election (LAI, 1998; Isak ed., 2007; and Wardaya, 2007).

One year later, in 1968, MPRS was appointed General Soeharto as Pemegang Suparsemar (Holders of the March 11th Warrant) of 1966 to become Acting President until a President elected by the new MPR will be formed in the next General Election in 1971. According to Sunarno (2011), and other scholars, revocation of President Soekarno’s authority was more political than juridical normative, even was the overthrow of Presidential power. Since then, the ORLA (Orde Lama or Old Order) regime under President Soekarno, 1945-1967, and the political hegemony of the PKI was over; political authority, then, replaced by the ORBA...

The new regime was based on a Presidential system and focused on the “political and economic stabilities”. A typical paradigm of the government was dominated by the Indonesian Military (Abdullah, 1985:38; McGregor, 2008; and Anwar, 2018). This paradigm was an anti-thesis of the President Soekarno’s regime that was characterized by inter-political party conflicts in the Parliament, which had led to a “civilian political bankruptcy” in 1958. To maintain and strengthen of his regime, President Soeharto maximized engagement of the Indonesian Military based on the doctrine so-called Dwi Fungsi ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) or “Dual Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces”, a doctrine of Indonesian Military participation in politics and government activities, which was developed from General A.H. (Abdul Haris) Nasution’s concept of the Jalan Tengah or “Middle Way” for the Indonesian Army in 1950s (Nasution, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Muhaimin, 2005; Sundhaussen, 2006; and Anwar, 2018).

In the doctrine mentioned two functions of the Indonesian Military-Army: firstly, the defense function: maintain security and order in the country; and, secondly, social and political function: participate in the power and rule the country. Based on the doctrine, the role and function of the Indonesian Military-Army not only provide channels for themselves as an organization—not individuals—to participate actively and directly in the social and political field on a limited basis. It had also provided a political space widely and openly for the Indonesian Military-Army to be active participate in determining the state policy at a highest level, from the center to the local authority (Harisanto, 1993; Sundhaussen, 2006; Rikan, 2014; and Anwar, 2018).

After the New Order regime collapsed in May 1998, the Indonesian Military function was gradually abolished, starting after the General Election of 2004 and completing in the General Election of 2009. Since that time, every Indonesian Military person, who will enter the political activity, she/he should repudiate his/her status and occupation in the Indonesian Military (Crouch, 2010; Rikan, 2014; and Anwar, 2018).

System and Structure of Political Parties, General Elections, and Parliament. The New Order regime policy on the political parties and General Election was “fusion or simplify the political parties”. It newly implemented in the General Election of 1977. In the history of the political parties in Indonesia, the policy had never really existed. Apparently, it based on the experience of the Parliamentary system previously ending with a “civilian political bankruptcy” in 1958. Learning to this, the New Order regime deemed necessary to reduce the number of political parties to avoid inter-political party conflicts, as well as to facilitate government control over political parties (Feith, 1962; Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017; and Ardanareswari, 2019).

Above all was to maintain political stability as a mainstream paradigm of the New Order regime. The number of political parties in the General Election of 1955 was 55 parties; the General Election of 1971 was 10 parties, and the General Elections of 1977 to 1997 remained two political parties, namely the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Development United Party) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party). Besides that, there was a GOLKAR (Golongan Karya or Functional Group), a non-party group formed by the New Order regime whose membership consisted of ABG, namely: ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Armed Forces), Birokrasi (Bureaucracy), and GOLKAR’s paths, from the Central government to the Villages administrative level in Indonesia (Suryadinata, 1992; Puspoyo, 2012; and Reeve, 2013).

In fact, the New Order regime efforted to reduce the number of political parties that had also been carried out by President Soekarno in 1960s. At that time, there were ten political parties approved to participate in Election of Parliament, other political parties dissolved to avoid a crisis of Konstituante or Constituent Assembly for Forming the

The differences of both were in the President Soekarno era (1959-1966), political parties were not diffusion but selected from existing parties according to the President Soekarno’s Guided Democracy concept. Meanwhile, in the President Soeharto era (1966-1998), political parties were diffused to maintain the “national stability” and based on a platform of the political parties, namely “Nationalist-Socialist-Democratic” and “Islam”. The PPP, for example, was a fusion of the Islamic political parties, such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama or Awakening of Islamic Cleric), PARMUSI (Partai Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Party), PSI (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic League Party), and PERTI (Pesatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah or United of Islamic Education).

While the PDI was a fusion of the “Nationalist-Socialist-Democratic” parties, such as PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Party), PARKINDO (Partai Kristen Protestan Indonesia or Indonesian Protestant Christian Party), Partai Katolik Indonesia (Indonesian Catholic Party), Partai Murba (Ordinary People Party), and IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Indonesian Independence Supporters Association). GOLKAR ownself claimed not as political party in the time of Indonesia New Order (Reeve, 2013; Fuad, 2015; and Abdul salam, 2019).

Since the PKI and its mass organizations were dissolved and banned, political rights of their members to participate in the party, to elect and/or be elected in the General Elections, and to become of the member of Parliaments were prohibited. In the New Order regime’s view, the General Elections and Parliament were a pillar of democracy. Meanwhile, they were considered “anti-democratic”, they were people/groups which want to destroy democracy itself. They also had not been recognizing to the principles of democracy and the enemies of Pancasila or Five Principles of the Republic of Indonesia (Liddle, 1992; Puspoyo, 2012; and Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017).

The State Officials, such as the Ministers, should also be neutral in the General Elections; although in practice, they were supporting to one of the parties, namely GOLKAR. They also “required” all the PNS (Pegawai Negeri Sipil or Civil Apparatuses of the Government) to vote GOLKAR. In this case, the New Order regime had actually violated the principles and provisions of the General Elections that had been defined, namely: firstly, Bebas (Free), in which every person chose freely according to his/her conscience without influence, pressure, or coercion from anyone or with anyway; and, secondly, Rahasia (Secret), in which what political parties were chosen not will be known by anyone and in any way, including those who selected. The Indonesian Military did also not have the right to elect and to be elected (Liddle, 1992; Widagdo et al., 1995; and Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017).

The purpose of the policy was to maintain a “Neutrality in General Elections and Political Parties” and to avoid a “Military Politicizing” by political parties. The Indonesian Military was the instrument of the state and socio-political power that must maintain the corps unity, and guarding and securing of Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. To accommodate the doctrine of Dwi Fungsi (Dual Functions) for Indonesian Military, the New Order regime stipulated of their membership in the Parliament, i.e. DPR/MPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or House of Representatives/People’s Consultative Assembly) as “a functional group” through the President’s appointment and on the based of the recommendation of the Commander in Chief of ABRI or Indonesian Armed Forces (Sundhaussen, 2006; Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017; and Yanuarti, 2018).

According to the Law No.2/1985, their amount in DPR/MPR came from the A (ABRI) path of the GOLKAR was 100 people, or 20% of all DPR memberships and 10% of all MPR memberships. They were in the “ABRI Fraction”. The New Order regime also appointed the PNS as members of the FUD (Fraksi Utusan Daerah or Regional Delegation Faction) in the DPR/MPR in Indonesia (Bivitri et al., 2002; Purnama, 2014; and Anwar, 2018).
Besides that, the membership of Parliament of the GOLKAR Fraction – a pro-government fraction – was constantly increasing for every General Election period. In General Election of 1971, for example, GOLKAR placed 236 representatives (62.82%); in General Election of 1977 was 232 representatives (62.11%); in General Election of 1982 was 242 representatives (62.11%); in General Election of 1987 was 299 representatives (68.34%); in General Election of 1992 was 282 representatives (73.16%); and in General Election of 1997, a final General Election during the New Order regime era – GOLKAR placed 325 representatives (68.10%) in the Indonesian Parliament. Accordingly, the alliance of the three fractions of the New Order regime supporters – Military, Regional Delegations, and GOLKAR – were greatly powerful, and truly effective to manage and control the entire processes in the Indonesian Parliament (Liddle, 1992; Puspoyo, 2012; Nisa, Na’im & Umamah, 2017; and Yanuarti, 2018).

**System and Structure of the Government.** The New Order regime had developed a parallel system and structure of the government with a “command system and structure” of the Indonesian Military. The Ministers largely were consisted of President Soeharto’s personal military staffs as SPRI (Staf Pribadi Presiden or Personal Staff of the President). To maintain national order and stability, all the strategic positions of the local governments, such as Governors, Regents/Mayors, Districts, and Villages came from the Indonesian Military. This strategy had been applied effectively since the 1950s in West Java, i.e. Siliwangi Army Division, to offset the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) power and its mass organizations to the Village level, and to establish good relations with local communities (Mas’oed, 1989 and 1996; Sundhaussen, 2006; Zulkifli at al. eds., 2014; and Yanuarti, 2018).

Conceptually, it can be traced back to the *Doktrin Perang Teritorial* (Doctrine of Territorial War), a strategy that justified the widespread involvement of the Indonesian Military-Army into all aspects of the state lives, politics, social, culture, economics, government, etc. based on strategic considerations and concerns of the military (Nasution, 1977, 1980 and 1985; Sundhaussen, 2006:248; and Rikan, 2014).

Thus, the New Order regime can integrate and control effectively and efficiently all Indonesian Military potencies in the executive, judicial, and legislative institutions under one command, namely President Soeharto. Nevertheless, it was difficult to conclude that Suharto’s era was “a military regime”. The Indonesian Military did not rule alone, although dominant, and what was called the “military regime” in Indonesian is a “civil-military fusion” (Abdullah, 1985:37; Jenkins, 2010; and Abdulsalam, 2018).

The civil-military relation in the era of New Order regime (1966-1998) was very good, not as extreme as in the previous periods. In addition, the Indonesian Military-Army domination in politics and national government can be seen as a victory over the Parliament and the civilian government during 1945-1958 periods, which has been “co-opted” by Parliamentary alienation and *divide et impera* (divided and ruled) policy. The control of Parliament over the Indonesian Military-Army was a subjective civilian control through the military civilization (Feith, 1962; Notosusanto, 1985:13-14; Kahin, 2013; and Anwar, 2018).

In this context, the Indonesian Military-Army had been positioned as a neutral institution of ideology, and as a fighting arena for ideological warriors. Position and role of the Indonesian Military-Army had been “marginalized” and “intervention” by the political parties’ power; and it had led to internal conflicts within the Indonesian Military-Army, and the Indonesian Military-Army against to the Parliament-Ministry political system, such as the “July 3, 1946 Affair”; “October 17, 1952 Affair”; and “June 22, 1955 Affair” (Feith, 1962; Dhakidae, 1985; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; Anderson, 1988; Sundhaussen, 2006; and Anwar, 2018).

**Security and Order Policy.** The stability paradigm also conducted by the New Order regime in the security and socio-political
order policies, particularly with respect to student's activities and organizations (in and out of campus); and to the mass media, particularly the press (Raillon, 1985; Hill, 2011; and Suwirta, 2018b).

In the history of Indonesian revolution, student/youth’s activities and organizations had the most important role. Among them had appeared the historical generations, such as the Generasi Kebangkitan Nasional or National Awakening Generation, in 1908; Generasi Sumpah Pemuda or Youth Oath Generation, in 1928; Generasi Revolusi Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Indonesian Independence Revolution Generation, in 1945; Generasi TRITURA (Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat) / AMPERA (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat) or Three People Demands' Generation / the Mandate of People's Suffering, in 1966; and so on (Martha, Wibisono & Anwar, 1985; Raillon, 1985; Anderson, 1988; and Patty, 2018). In the early years of the New Order regime, they were more autonomous and were derived from the cadres of out-campus organizations, independent activists of various study groups, and other activist groups. They were also engaged in political activity (Martha, Wibisono & Anwar, 1985; Raillon, 1985; Anderson, 1988; and Patty, 2018).

During the New Order regime ruling, at least, there were two important events had become a precedent to the new regime's repressive actions against the political rights of students. Firstly was the “MALARI (Malapetaka 15 Januari of January 15th Havoc) of 1974 Affair”, when they demonstrated against the political issues on corruption, domination of the Chinese capitalist, and Japanese investors (Raillon, 1985; Jazimah, 2013; Suwirta, 2018a; and Wirajati, 2018). Secondly, when they demonstrated to protest the government irregularities in the electoral politics and in the nature and strategy of development in 1977. Their leaders were arrested and jailed on accuse of subversive activities, considered to jeopardize the position of the regime and threaten the stability of the nation and the state (Suharsih & Mahendra, 2007; Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018; and Sitompul, 2018). Since that time, the New Order regime freezed all in-campus student's organizations, namely DEMA (Dewan Mahasiswa or Students Council) and MPM (Majelis Presidium Mahasiswa or Students Presidium Assembly), and promoted a new students policy, namely NKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus or Normalization of Campus Life). All student's political activism was over and "institutionalized" in the intra-campus student organizations. So, students' activism focused solely on academic and not on politics (Usman, 1999; Firdausi, 2018; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018).

Period 1978-1989, the New Order regime only allowed the students' organization, namely SEMA (Senat Mahasiswa or Student Senate) at the Faculty level only; and at the University level was newly allowed in 1990s. Their activities are also determined based on the Rector and Vice Rector III policy and power as Leaders of Campus or Higher Education Institution (Raillon, 1985; Firdausi, 2018; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018).

A political and bureaucratic atmosphere slightly reduced in 1980s, when the New Order regime launched a policy on the “intra-campus” organizations by establishing the students' study groups; and the “extra-campus” organization that affiliated and/or independent of the political parties, so they were able to participate in out-campus political activities, and to avoid the repressive actions of the government (Magenda, 1985; Firdausi, 2018; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018). However, when the New Order regime regulated the Law No.8/1985 on ORMAS (Organisasi Massa or Mass Organization), the students' organizations cannot actively involve to politics freely without government controls strictly through determination of Pancasila (Five Basic Principles of the Republic of Indonesia) as the only one of the foundations for any mass organization – well-known as the Azas Tunggal (Single Principle). This policy caused all mass organizations, and also the political parties, became apathetic to participate into politics activities; even, some organizations became a political tool of the regime (Noer, 1984; Humaidi, 2010; and
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This situation, which had caused turmoil in the community, then led to the emergence of a number of national tragedies, such as “Tanjung Priok Tragedy of 1984” in North Jakarta and “Petition of 50.” The tragedy had been demanded the New Order regime did not enforce the *Pancasila* principles to all political parties and organizations (Jenkins, 2010; Humaidi, 2010; and Suwirta, 2017).

The mass media, particularly press, was also not free from the New Order regime’s control. During period 1970-1990, more than 30 national/local presses and 9 campus/students’ presses were warned, suppressed, even their licenses revoked. Some press figures were also imprisoned. The repressive actions of the New Order regime more increased during the 1980s, since the Law No.21/1982 on the “Principal Provisions of the Press” regulated in Indonesia (Raillon, 1985; Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; Suwirta, 2017; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018).

Although a massive banning to the press no longer like in 1970s, repressive action to the press was consistently done, especially if the press considered tended to be unilateral, be negative or opposed to the officials or the government. The control of the regime had caused only 130 presses were registered in 1966, decreased to 95 presses in 1982, and since the New Order regime was the collapse in 1998, only 71 presses were registered, but that capable of publish were only 51 presses (Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; and Suwirta, 2018a and 2018b).

In many cases, the press banning and/or their figures arresting was related to their news on pornography; gambling code; corruption, cronism, and nepotism in government circles, involving the President Soeharto’s family and the Indonesian Military; students protest movement; and issues on the national leadership succession or openness in the opinion. The most prominent case was when the press reported the issues on “spreading hatred” among the people. So that, control of the press was not fully caused by repressive regime attitudes, but also caused by the press attitudes which had not been fully independent in its news and views (Hill, 2011; Suwirta, 2015 and 2017; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018).

The press, sometimes, not cover both sides in the news. Intervention of various external interests, e.g. politics, economics, religion, etc., to the independence of the press were also often and unwittingly caused them to be a subjective when reporting the crucial issues in society, such as race, religion, tribe, ethnicity, and class. However, the press was not value-free. They had a “media policy”, a phenomenon that cannot be denied in the press activity, including in Indonesia. It may be said that there were none of the press/media, which did not play politics in its news and views (Raillon, 1985; Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; Suwirta, 2015 and 2017; and Rizkiah, Suwirta & Supriatna, 2018).

Indonesian press was one of the pillars of democracy, which had a legal, ethical, and moral responsibility to uphold the basic values of democracy. They had been also a social and moral responsible to promote the establishment of the rule of law and human rights critically and corrective through the presentation of news in a free, open, accurate, true, and fair accordance with the code of journalistic ethics and independence. However, if the press criticizing and correcting the regime, then considered as anti-*Pancasila*, anti-development under the name of national stability, or they considered as the right ad/or left-extreme, and so on, of course, such action was against the values and principles of democracy (Said, 2009; Hill, 2011; Suwirta, 2015 and 2017; and Oktavianti, 2016).

Moreover, in the Law No.11/1962 on the “Basic Principles of the Press”, article 4 stated that to the national press was not subject to censorship and banning. In other words, from a “political stability” perspective, such as action may be understood, but from a perspective of democratic values within the military, it was certainly not paralleled to the commitment that the Indonesian Military should encouraged to the growth and maturation of democratic life. What the regime did to maintain political stability seemed an “taming act” of the press (Abdullah, 1985:44; Simatupang, 1985:49; Luwarso, 2003; Suwirta, 2008; and Hill, 2011).
Institution that had a strategic role to maintain the security and socio-political order during the New Order regime era was the KOPKAMTIB (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban or Command of Operation to Restore Security and Order), which was under the direct Command of the President Soeharto. During the 23 years of the New Order regime ruling, they had become a "military government task force" that can used all the civilian assets, personnel, and authority, even of the Indonesian Armed Forces for implementing the security and intelligence activities (Elson, 2001; Jenkins, 2010; and Farihi, 2018).

It can be said that they were "the heart of power of the regime" that able to coordinate the number of intelligence agencies (military and non-military). In 1988, they were dissolved and replaced by the BAKORSTRANAS (Badan Koordinasi dan Strategis Pertahanan Nasional or National Defense Coordinating and Strategic Agency) with the tasks and functions were not much different than the KOPKAMTIB (Elson, 2001; Farihi, 2018; and Matanasi, 2018).

The Movement in Collective Memories of the Nation. For historians and Indonesian generations, the event of G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, not only indicated a phase of political regime changed or dramatically changed in the social, politics, economics, and culture. Furthermore, it had caused a prolonged trauma for the Indonesian people. Knowingly, or not, it still perceived and remembered by them as an intrigue, intimidation, atrocity, pogrom, and genocide periods (Sulistyo, 2003; Roosa, 2006 and 2008; Sumarwan, 2007; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018). Another scholars also said on the G-30-S of 1965 and its implications, as following here:

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\text{Violence as it reflects a humanitarian catastrophe [...]}. \text{Whatever connection the PKI had was insufficient by itself to justify violence against everyone associated with it (Roosa, 2006:xviii and 33).}
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Hannah Arendt (1998), and other scholars, suggested also that violence never got the social and moral support from society completely. Violence was merely justified never legitimate. For Hannah Arendt (1998), and other scholars, the violence came from the attitude of totalitarianism. It was just an instrument, a part of the force. However, it had never been a system of values, which was the basis of collective power. It required a collective justification, rationalization, and normative confirmation (cf Arendt, 1998; Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019).
As Elie Wiesel (1985), cited also in MNs (Museum News) in 2007, and other scholars, stated that to kill or any violence acts, absolutely, first of all, to undermine the healthy zones of the human being and the morale of the person. That was its goal, that the person should be so demoralized that he or she would lose hope (Wiesel, 1985; Nicholls, 2004; MNs, 2007:36; Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019).

Elie Wiesel (1985), as cited also in A. Sumarwan (2007) and other scholars, stated also that this was a product of hatred, and the hatred, whatever in the name placed – racial, tribal, religious, ancestral, national, social, ethical, political, economic, or ideological – in fact, in itself displayed a most crushing of human defeat, an absolute defeat to human being, to humanity (Wiesel, 1985; Nicholls, 2004; Sumarwan, 2007:269; Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019).

Hermawan Sulistyo (2003), and other scholars’ study, had revealed that the massacre carried out on young people, so it impressed as a rite of passage for those who will enter adulthood. Even, A. Sumarwan (2007), and other scholars’ study, on a story of 1965 political detainees and reconciliation efforts in Bali, explored that the use of cultural symbols-religious behind the massacre (cf Cribb ed., 1991; Cribb, 2001; Sulistyso, 2003; Sumarwan, 2007; Roosa, 2008; Marching, 2017; and McGregor, Melvin & Pohlman eds., 2018). In this context, A. Sumarwan (2007), then, sated as following here:

[...] against the PKI was a holy war, for the sake of fulfilling a religious obligation to purify the island [...]. The enemies of our revolution were also the most ferocious enemy of religion, and it should be killed and destroyed down to the roots. Extermination the root of GESTAPU/PKI and NEOKOLIM (Neo-Colonialism) was an obligatory godly duty [...] the killing of Communists was “the will of God” (Sumarwan, 2007:360 and 372).

Knowingly, or not, beyond of their religious consciousness to murder, in fact, there was New Order regime interests to eradicate their ideological enemies and, at the same time, attempting to build a prestige of the ruling power over the evil of the opponent ideology. In this context also, S. Frunză (2008) stated as following here:

The event speaks of the necessity of cultivating in each person a consciousness of responsibility in the face of terror, violence, and the attempt to use religion or ideology against other individuals or communities (Frunză, 2008:109).

Lastly, in P. Bourdieu (1989) and other scholars’ conception on “symbolic struggle”, the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, can be viewed as an individually or collectively struggle to maintain the stability and durability of social order within a space of relative autonomy with a flexibility of freedom for political and social action. The aim was redefining the world and opening up new possibilities based on new symbolic power, which can manipulate hopes and expectations, especially through a more or less inspired and uplifting pre-formative evocation of the future (Bourdieu, 1989; Roosa, 2008; Siregar, 2016; Melvin, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

Within this situation, anyone/any group can take violence actions and, then, see and re-imagine themselves as a human being against another person or group, which had denigrated and commodified as the creator of disruption, resistance, and disorder (Bourdieu, 1989; Melvin, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

Hannah Arendt’s Forgiveness: A Humanitarian Perspective for the Ex G-30-S of 1965. Another important aspect of the G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965, and aftermath, was associated with the New Order regime policy for ex G-30-S of 1965’s prisoners/detainees. Knowingly, or not, the event had provided a heavy burden for the nation and future generations in Indonesia (Roosa, 2008; Munsu, 2016; Marching, 2017; McGregor, Melvin & Pohlman ed., 2018; and Robinson, 2018).

To overcome was a collective duty that must be borne by the entire nation, if we want to be a civilized nation in the world community. We all must resolve alleged violations of human rights of the political prisoners/detainees of the ex G-30-S of 1965...
and/or their families, to uncover the truth, to give forgiveness, and to respect for human rights, democracy, social justice, communal environmental safety for them, as well as to reconcile them as citizens, and for peace and national unity.

Nevertheless, it seemed, had become a law of history, when a New Order regime (1966-1998) replaced the Old Order regime (1959-1966), especially if it happened in complicated and complex political events, they were necessarily going to build a fresh social and political structure according to their own paradigm (McGregor, 2008; Lev, 2009; Rikan, 2014; Indrajat, 2017; and Winata, 2017).

During the New Order regime ruling, it seemed could not be done, although, actually was possible according to the Constitution of 1945, article 14, in which stated that the President authorized to give the rehabilitation based on the MA (Mahkamah Agung or Supreme Court)’s judgments, and to give amnesty and abolition based on the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representatives)’ considerations in Indonesia (Munir et al., 2005; Soemantri, 2007; and Yani, 2018).

However, this article of 1945 Constitution newly implemented after the President Soeharto’s regime collapsed in a bloody revolution and the people power, well-known as “May 1998 Affair” by the next Presidents of B.J. (Bacharuddin Jusuf) Habibie, 1998-1999; K.H. (Kyai Haji) Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, 1999-2001; and Megawati Soekarno Putri, 2002-2004. President B.J. Habibie and President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, had been given forgiveness (amnesty and abolition) to 1,400 – 1,800 political prisoners/detainees of ex G-30-S/ PKI (Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party) in 1965 in Indonesia (Budiawan, 2000 and 2004; Munsi, 2016; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

In 2000, President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid also sought to revoke the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly)’s Decree on the dissolution of the PKI, but he was opposed by various parties, such as the Parliament, Government Officials, Political Organizations, Mass Organizations, and of course, the Indonesian Military, particularly Army. On one hand, these oppositions were understandable, because the PKI was considered to have betrayed the country. On the other hand, a discrimination and “heritage punishment” for those was also cannot be justified. It was “a crime against humanity” (Sherlock, 2000; Barton, 2010; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

In the context of education, P. Freire (2005), in his work on Pedagogy of the Oppressed, said as following here:

_They can run the risk of losing oneself in the disconnectedness of practice and of the responsible to active participate in the social construction_ (Freire, 2005:20).

Hannah Arendt (1998), in her work on The Human Condition, also stated as following here:

_Discrimination or alienation actions would eliminate their existence from public space and narrow their opportunities to establish a stable identity and to act spontaneously together with others for creating a shared interaction space in a free public discourse_ (Arendt, 1998).

However, in 2003, the MK (Mahkamah Konstitusi or Constitutional Court) had revoked the Law No.12/2003, article 60g, that the Parliament candidates were not an ex-PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party), including mass organizations, or persons involved directly or indirectly in G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement)/PKI in 1965. MK has decided that it violated the human rights in the Constitution of 1945, and has regained their political rights, so they have rights to vote and be elected since 2004.

The decision should also be interpreted as a miteinander activity (reciprocity dialogues) of the state to build a collective participation of all citizens in social and politics without exception. Everyone, even the state, needs to free and forgive her/himself from the burden of the past based on sense of understanding (Sutiyoso, 2008; Mietzner, 2010; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).
Again, Hannah Arendt (1998), and other scholars, stated that forgiveness was an ability to facilitate reconciliation between forgiver and forgiven. It has allowed us to continue living and acting together, to remain engaged in a collective project, despite the inevitable trespasses of communal life. It was enable forgiver and forgiven to begin again, to rebuild the common world in a shape unbridled by the transgressions of history (Arendt, 1998; Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019). Hannah Arendt (1998), then, stated as following here:

*Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to a single deed from, which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice, who lacked the magic formula to break the spell* (Arendt, 1998:237).

Without forgiveness every wrong would quickly snowball, with every reaction creating still more vengeance and only adding fuel to increasing fires of political resentment. Humanity must, above all, without bloodshed, without hate and revenge by the name of country goodness. Within P. Freire (2005), and other scholars’ perspectives on educational philosophy, forgiveness can be seen as an instrument for liberation, a mutual process, world-mediated for a person as uncompleted beings, who conscious of their imperfection and who attempt to be more fully person (*cf* Arendt, 1998; Freire, 2005; Molan, 2009; Johnson, 2016; and Kautzer, 2019).

The crucial problem which was still unresolved up to know related to forgiveness for the prisoners/detainees of ex G-30-S (*Gerakan 30 September* or September 30th Movement) of 1965/PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party) was a “reconciliation”. The Law No.27/2004 on the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” had attempted to give a judicial space for those to reveal the truth, uphold justice, to establish a culture of respect for human rights, and to achieve reconciliation and national unity, through rehabilitation and amnesty or forgiveness of the President. Unfortunately, in 2006, the MK (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* or Constitutional Court) had declared it “*a quo as a whole is against the Constitution of 1945, and it does not have a binding legal force*” (MK, 2006:7).

In the MK (2006)’s considerations, even though it was canceled nor implied that efforts to solve human rights violations in the past have been closed. Many ways can be done by shaping legal policies (laws) were accordance with the Constitution of 1945 and international human rights instruments, or a reconciliation through political wisdom on rehabilitation and general amnesty. It means that efforts and way-out to reconcile them are still open (MK, 2006; Sutiyoso, 2008; Mietzner, 2010; Adam, 2018; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

With all due respect, for victims of the G-30-S/PKI of 1965 and they had seriously violence of human rights as ordered in the Constitution of 1945, the MK’s considerations were suitable to be attempted. If it can be realized, behind an event, however, it was dark, undoubtedly there was a meaning inside for the future generations to keep always the national vigilance, and not to repeat the events that can be fatal to community, nation, and the state (Nitosusanto & Saleh, 1989; Setneg RI, 1994; MK, 2006; Mietzner, 2010; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).

This was the significance of Hannah Arendt (1998), and other scholars’ thought, on the remembrance as an ethical struggle against the erosion of past events. It was correlated with the efforts and awareness to construct the future, and to transmit meanings of the events of the past to the younger generation (Arendt, 1998; Molan, 2009; and Kautzer, 2019).

The scholars’ ideas about forgiveness have also provided an ethical perspective of democratic egalitarian for a revolutionary foundation of the modern nation-state constitution and international law. Forgiveness does not change the past, but it does enlarge the future, hopefully (Zurbuchen, 2002; Budiawan, 2004; Brunkhorst, 2008; Siahaan, 2014; and Sanita & Rianto, 2018).
CONCLUSION

The G-30-S (Gerakan 30 September or September 30th Movement) of 1965 was a largest national tragedy since the Republic of Indonesia had gained its independence on August 17th, 1945. It was a darkness episode in Indonesian collective memory and revolution towards a democratic state. It was also still remains a lot of problems, both before and aftermath.

The study shown, socio-politically, the G-30-S of 1965 was a rivalry of Indonesian political powers between the TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Military-Army, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indoensia or Indonesian Communist Party), and President Soekarno. The success of the Indonesian Military-Army, under General Soeharto, in winning the rivalry had brought further consequences to changes in political systems, structures, and processes and Indonesian government for a period of 30 years (1968-1998).

After all, the G-30-S of 1965 and aftermath had provided a prolonged trauma for the Indonesian people, and it became a collective memory of the Indonesian people. This trauma needed to be ended and resolved properly and wisely, because, consciously or not, this will become a heavy burden for the nation and future Indonesia generations. If we want to be a civilized nation in the world community, we all must resolve alleged violations of human rights of the political prisoners/detainees of the Ex G-30-S of 1965 and/or their families, to uncover the truth, to give forgiveness, and to respect for human rights, democracy, social justice, communal environmental safety for them, as well as to reconcile them as citizens, and for peace and national unity.

Hopefully, the paper can give an important meaning of the events to the citizenship education for the next Indonesia generations, so they are more thoughtful in addressing the nation’s history.¹

¹Statement: We, herewith, declare that this article is not product of plagiarism, not also to be submitted, reviewed as well as published by other scholarly journals. Having received finally by the Editors, this article will not to be withdrawn by the Authors from the TAWARIKH journal. This statement was actually made to be used by the Editor properly.

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